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The popularity of commercial arbitration as an alternative for the
resolution of contractual disputes is increasing, as is criticism of the ex-
isting remedial schemes for shareholder derivative actions. As a result,
commentators and practitioners have begun to consider the feasibility
and merits of arbitrating shareholder derivative claims pursuant to arbi-
tration provisions in corporate charters. Professor Shell reviews the stat-
utory scheme for arbitration and discusses how arbitration is used to
resolve shareholder actions in closely held corporations. He then ana-
lyzes the Federal Arbitration Act to determine if an arbitration provision
in the charter of a publicly traded corporation would be enforceable.
Professor Shell concludes that arbitration is legally feasible for the pub-
lic corporation but is not likely to become a primary method for han-
dling shareholder derivative claims. Nevertheless, corporations should
experiment with its use as an alternative method for resolving such
disputes.
Public corporations are resorting to arbitration as an alternative to the
courts with increasing frequency. In labor relations, an estimated ninety-four
percent of all collective bargaining agreements between corporations and organ-
ized labor contain arbitration clauses. 1 Spurred by recent Supreme Court victo-
ries,2 publicly held securities brokerage firms are arbitrating disputes with
customers in record numbers pursuant to the rules of the major exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers. 3 The employment agreements
between some of the nation's largest public companies and their senior execu-
tives similarly call for arbitration of compensation and other employment-
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1. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
747 (1973).
2. See, eg., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Brown, Shell & Tyson, Arbitration of Customer-
Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws and RICO, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 7-11
(1987); Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397 (1988).
3. Business Bulletin, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 5 (National Association of Securities
Dealers reports that more than 4,000 arbitration cases were filed with it in 1988, as compared with
2,886 cases in 1987); October 19 Still Isn't Over, FORTUNE, Mar. 14, 1988, at 12 (reporting that
arbitration caseloads in securities industry as a whole were up over 50% since October 1987 stock
market crash).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
related controversies. 4 Finally, public corporations, like other business enter-
prises, are using arbitration to resolve differences with suppliers, franchisees,
dealers, and even competitors.5 In short, the modem public corporation is rely-
ing on arbitration to strengthen virtually every strand in its "web of contracts."
'6
At the same time that the arbitration alternative is gaining new legitimacy,
the shareholder derivative action-a staple form of corporate litigation 7 -has
been the subject of a fresh round of criticism. The American Law Institute's
(ALl) Corporate Governance Project has made proposals regarding shareholder
remedies8 that have become the focal point for an intense debate regarding the
4. See, eg., Graphic Scanning Corp. v. Yampol, 688 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (arbitra-
tion agreement between CEO and public corporation); GAF Corp. v. Wemer, 66 N.Y.2d 97, 495
N.Y.S.2d 312, 485 N.E.2d 977 (1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986); Faberge Int'l, Inc.
v. Di Pino, 109 A.D.2d 235, 491 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1985) (arbitration clause in employment agreement
with executive vice president). A casual review of annual 10-K filings with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission revealed employment agreements between a number of public companies and
their senior executives containing arbitration clauses. These companies included Borden, Cessna
Aircraft Company, and CPC International. See generally I A. KROLL, EMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION 11011.12 (1985) (model employment agreement contains an arbitration clause). Such clauses,
however, are probably still the exception rather than the rule in corporate practice.
5. See Comment, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure For Dispute Resolution Act: Van-
guard of a "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1747 (1988) (discussing IBM-Fujitsu trade
secret arbitration). The American Arbitration Association has reported a 49% increase in its com-
mercial case filings of all sorts over the period 1983 to 1987. 1987 AAA Statistical Report 6 (June 1,
1988) (on file with the author).
6. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1, 12 (1986). Indeed, according to recent declarations by legal commentators, conventional commer-
cial arbitration has now "come of age." Pitt & Schropp, Arbitration of Securities Law Disputes
Comes of Age, 1 INSIGHTS 10 (Sept. 1987); see, eg., Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, The McMahon
Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securitles and RICO Claims, 19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1988);
Hood, Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers' Claims Against Broker-Dealers After McMa-
hon, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541 (1988). Arbitration is generally viewed as faster, cheaper, and more
flexible than court litigation. See infra note 24. For most commercial disputes, this is an attractive
combination when compared to the delay, expense, and formality of the courts. Indeed, there seem
to be few areas of commercial practice that have not begun to feel the pressure to consider the option
of replacing traditional court litigation with private arbitration as the means of resolving commercial
differences. See, eg., Saturday Evening Post v. Rumbleseat Press, 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987)
(permitting arbitration of copyright claims); Gutter & Torpey, Lenders Use Arbitration Clauses and
Jury Waivers to Protect Their Rights, 8 Bus. LAW. UPDATE, No. 3, at 3 (1988) (banks increasingly
using arbitration clauses in loan documentation); Comment, supra note 5, at 1747 (describing IBM-
Fujitsu arbitration to resolve trade secret dispute). Many commercial claims that were recently
thought to be well beyond the jurisdiction of private arbitrators have been declared by the courts to
be appropriate matters for resolution in the arbitral forum. See, eg., McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332
(declaring that claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act are suitable for arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.) (claims under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 are
subject to arbitration), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 389 (1988); Gemco Latinoamerica v. Seiko Time
Corp., 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 67,770 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (domestic antitrust claims between com-
panies subject to arbitration).
7. Shareholders have the right to bring two kinds of lawsuits against corporate managers:
derivative and direct actions. Whether an action is characterized as one or the other depends on the
types of injuries alleged. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. This Article deals primarily
with the use of arbitration to resolve derivative claims, but many of the issues and arguments dis-
cussed apply equally to the arbitration of direct actions on either an individual or class basis.
8. These proposals are contained in a series of drafts that have yet to be finally approved by
the members of the ALl. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§§ 7.01-7.18 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Oct. 10, 1986). In general, the ALI has proposed that the derivative
action be retained and that the corporate board of directors be given discretion, in certain listed
situations, to appoint a special committee of independent board members to review the derivative
claim and make a recommendation to the court regarding the disposition of the case. Id.
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role of these lawsuits in corporate governance. 9 In commenting on the ALI's
proposals, some scholars have called for significant changes in the existing reme-
dial scheme.' 0 Others have advocated the abolition of shareholder derivative
actions altogether. "1
These two trends have not yet met in practice, but academic commenta-
tors,12 corporate practitioners,1 3 and professional dispute resolution oiganiza-
tions 14 have begun to discuss the feasibility and merits of arbitrating public
shareholder derivative claims pursuant to arbitration provisions placed in corpo-
rate charters. The use of arbitration as a means of resolving governance disputes
in public corporations promises to stir substantial legal controversy.
Arbitration is a private means of settling differences that places concerns
for equity and efficiency above strict observance of legal norms. Jucicial in-
volvement in the arbitration process is minimal, and judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards is limited. 15 Arbitration thus attenuates the connection between the
state and the corporation in a way that will alarm many. Moreover, if the state-
created procedural rights embodied in derivative action statutes are waivable by
a corporate charter amendment, perhaps shareholders may "opt out" of other
seemingly mandatory legal controls, up to and including substantive fiduciary
duties imposed on corporate officers and directors by state law.
16
On the other hand, growing evidence indicates that, when the costs of de-
rivative litigation are compared with the benefits such suits generate for public
corporations, derivative actions may not be cost-effective for the majority of cor-
porate shareholders.' 7 The corporation often shoulders most of the costs of
9. See, eg., Cox, Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit
Procedures, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 745 (1984); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1259 n.1 (1983) (citing literature discussing corporate governance); Scott,
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REv.
927 (1982). This debate has extended beyond academic circles to corporate policy commentators.
See Kristol, The War Against the Corporation, Wall. St. J., Jan. 24, 1989, at A-20, col. 3 (arguing
that the ALI proposals on the handling of derivative actions would severely hamper effective corpo-
rate governance).
10. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. Rlv. 669, 725
(1986) (calling for awards of multiple damages or greatly increased attorneys' fees for plaintiffs'
lawyers in derivative cases); Scott, supra note 9, at 927 (calling for elimination of liability for duty of
care violations).
11. Comment, Shareholders'Derivative Suits and Shareholder Welfare: An Evaluation and Pro-
posal, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 856, 902-03 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Coffee, No Exit? Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the
Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 919 (1988).
13. See, eg., Pitt & Schropp, supra note 6.
14. See Franklin, Courthouse Closed? Required Mediation of Shareholder Suits Weighed,
N.Y.LJ., Sept. 24, 1987, at 5, col. 2 (reporting that the Center for Public Resources, a New York-
based dispute resolution organization, is studying alternative dispute resolution techniques for
resolving shareholder disputes).
15. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
16. Coffee, supra note 12, at 925-31.
17. Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 292 (1986) (stating that market price
of shares in subject corporations is not materially affected by announcement that derivative actions
have been dismissed or terminated); Jaffe & Westerfield, Shareholder Suits and Shareholder Welfare:
Some Evidence from the Stock Market (1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (stat-
1989]
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shareholder suits, including the payment of attorneys' fees to the lawyers for
both plaintiffs and defendants.1 8 This practice minimizes the net recovery to the
corporation from settlements and judgments. 19 Thus, shareholders may gain
from the use of more efficient means of resolving these cases.20 As to the criti-
cism that arbitration would delegalize corporate governance, the vast majority
of derivative actions are dismissed or settled short of trial,21 a fact that indicates
the judicial forum is not as crucial to the suits' effectiveness as may appear at
first glance.
This Article lays a foundation for the debate over the arbitration of deriva-
tive claims. Part I of the Article reviews background material on commercial
arbitration practice and discusses recent developments in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 22 that form the basis for
the discussion of arbitrating shareholder suits. In part II, the Article reviews the
role arbitration has played in one important corporate setting, that of the closely
held corporation. This section demonstrates that, after years of fighting in the
courts and legislatures, shareholders in closely held corporations have won the
right to use the arbitration forum.
Part III explores the issue of arbitrating public shareholder disputes. First,
this section describes the essential characteristics of shareholder derivative ac-
tions and discusses the role this remedy plays in the traditional model of corpo-
rate governance. Next, part III analyzes the legal objections that might be
raised if public corporations seek to require arbitration of shareholder disputes
under an arbitration provision inserted in the corporation's charter. This analy-
ing that market price of shares of subject corporations is negatively affected by announcement that
shareholder action has been filed).
18. See infra note 142-43 and accompanying text.
19. Every state's corporation laws permit or require the corporation, under certain circum-
stances, to indemnify corporate directors for expenses and settlement payments made in connection
with shareholder suits. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr §§ 8.50-8.58 (1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-727 (McKinney 1986). In addition,
most states permit corporations to purchase insurance to cover officers and directors who are sued.
Such insurance may cover matters that cannot be indemnified under the corporation statute. R.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 5.10, at 668 (1986). The Wyatt Company, a consulting firm that con-
ducts an extensive annual survey of claims against officers and directors, has estimated that in 1987
the average cost to U.S. nonbank corporations of defending the 111 shareholder actions (both deriva-
tive and direct) reported was $513,409. THE WYATr Co., THE 1987 WYAiT DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS & FIDUCIARY LIABILITY SURVEY 30 (1987). The median amount of such fees was
$275,000 and the highest amount was $4,000,000. Id. Moreover, companies made claims against
insurers for settlement amounts ranging from $500,000 to over $5,000,000. Id. at 29. Seventy-four
percent of the total sample of claims, however, were reported as "Closed No Payment." Id. When
one takes into account the fact that roughly 20% of any settlement is paid to the attorneys represent-
ing the shareholder-plaintiffs, see infra note 142 and accompanying text, the opportunity costs of
having managers tied up in the shareholder litigation, and actual expenses such as insurance premi-
ums paid by the corporation, the net benefit of shareholder litigation to shareholders as a group is
debatable.
20. There is also reason to believe that the monitoring benefits of derivative actions are over-
stated. Many derivative suits are filed in the wake of revelations by public agencies and "piggyback"
on the investigative efforts of others without providing additional monitoring benefits to sharehold-
ers. See Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from
an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 376-77 (1988).
21. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REv. 542, 545 (1980) (over 70% of cases studied settled).
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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sis leads to the conclusion that a corporate charter arbitration provision is likely
to be enforceable under the FAA so long as the corporation takes adequate steps
to notify shareholders of the existence of the clause. Part III closes with an
analysis of the policy questions underlying these issues.
In part IV the Article speculates about the future of arbitration as a means
of resolving public shareholder actions. This section presents an analytic model
based on transaction cost economics to probe the likelihood of widespread use of
arbitration in the public corporation context. The transaction cost model con-
firms present practice, namely that arbitration is likely to play a more prominent
role in resolving disputes among shareholders of close corporations than dis-
putes between shareholders and managers of public entities. Part IV next identi-
fies some practical constraints on the use of arbitration in public corporations
that may discourage its use.
The Article concludes that arbitration is not likely to be utilized to resolve
shareholder derivative suits on any systematic, widespread basis. Nevertheless,
because arbitration has gained acceptance in the legal environment, public cor-
porations should be permitted and encouraged to experiment with it.
I. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW: CURRENT PRACTICE
Arbitration is a private means of resolving disputes through the use of neu-
tral third parties who are engaged by the parties to review disputed claims and
render a binding decision.23 Commercial arbitration is typically conducted pur-
suant to contractual agreements to submit either future or existing disputes to an
arbitrator for resolution. Arbitration is generally thought to be cheaper, faster,
and more flexible than litigation as a means of resolving commercial disputes.24
Arbitration is also desirable because experts familiar with the customs and prac-
tices peculiar to an industry may serve as arbitrators.
25
A. Basic Commercial Arbitration Procedures
The actual processes by which claims are adjudicated in commercial arbi-
23. M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION 1 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1984); Shell, Res Judicata
and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 628-29 (1988).
24. See Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternativ" A Comparative Analysis of Case
Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts,
8 JusT. Sys. J. 6-7 (1983). The New York Stock Exchange reported to the author that the average
arbitration under the auspices of that organization takes less than one year to complete from initial
demand to final award. See Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 3,
1987, at 32, col. 2. Moreover, a recent comparative study of customer-broker securities arbitration
with similar cases brought in court concluded that the average arbitration takes 434 days to con-
clude, as compared with 599 days for a similar litigated case. The average cost of defending cus-
tomer-broker disputes in court was $20,000 per case as compared with $8,000 per case in arbitration.
Finally, customers recovered an average of $35,000 per claim in arbitration as compared with
$25,000 per claim in litigation. See Letter from James E. Buck, Senior Vice President and Secretary
of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to The Honorable David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Exhibit A (Oct. 14, 1988) (on file with the author) (reporting results
of comparative study of 243 cases in arbitration and litigation conducted by Deloitte, Haskins &
Sells at request of New York Stock Exchange).
25. R. COULSON, BUSINEss ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 9 (3d ed. 1986).
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tration vary. The American Arbitration Association's (AAA) Commercial Ar-
bitration Rules offer an example of the general procedures usually encountered
in commercial arbitration. A claimant initiates arbitration under the AAA rules
by filing a written demand and serving this demand on the opposing side.
26
Once the demand is filed and a response received, arbitrators are appointed.
Arbitrators need not be lawyers or even familiar with the law that may govern a
particular dispute.27 Under the AAA rules the parties receive lists of potential
arbitrators and their biographical sketches. Each party then strikes from the list
those arbitrators to whom he objects. The AAA administrator compares the
lists and selects an arbitrator or panel from the remaining names.
28
The rules make no provision for mandatory evidentiary discovery prior to
the arbitration hearing.2 9 Under federal and state arbitration statutes, however,
arbitrators have the power to subpoena evidence and witnesses for the hearing,
3 0
and some state arbitration statutes expressly provide for prehearing exchange of
documents and/or depositions of witnesses who will not be available to testify.
3 1
Courts sometimes order prehearing depositions in aid of arbitration in extraordi-
nary circumstances.3 2 In addition, a court that has stayed judicial proceedings
pending arbitration can order discovery if such an order does not interfere with
the arbitration.
33
Arbitration hearings are informal. The arbitrators need not apply rules of
evidence;34 parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses liberally;35 and the
record may include testimony by affidavit at the discretion of the arbitrator.
3 6
The AAA does not require that a stenographic record be kept of the proceed-
26. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 6(a)-(b)
[hereinafter AAA RULE] (effective Sept. 1, 1988). The AAA has slightly different and, in some
respects, more formal rules governing securities disputes. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIA-
TION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES (effective Sept. 1, 1987); Shell, supra note 2, at 422-23.
27. Lawyers, however, are frequently found on lists of persons available to serve as arbitrators,
and many commercial arbitration panels doubtless have one or more lawyer members. See Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2340 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985); R. COULSON, supra note 25, at 9.
28. AAA RULE 13; see Posner & Landis, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 248 (1979). Parties may also select arbitrators by other methods if they mutually agree on a
procedure. AAA RULES 14, 15.
29. The AAA Rules simply do not address the subject of discovery and provide only that "[a]n
arbitrator or other person authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon
the request of any party or independently." AAA RULE 31.
30. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982); UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT § 7, 7 U.L.A. 114 (1985).
31. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-412 (1982); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 251, § 10 (1977); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 3102(c) (McKinney 1970); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7309(c) (1982).
32. See Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Needfor Enhanced Accom-
modation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219, 250-51 (1986); Willenken, The Often
Overlooked Use of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal
Common Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 173 (1979); Note, Relaxing the Standardfor Court-Ordered Discovery
in Aid of CommercialArbitration, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1448 (1982).
33. See Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 453 (1987); Note, Arbitration andAward-Discovery-Court May Permit
Discovery on the Merits When it Will not Delay Arbitration, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (1975).
34. AAA RULE 31.
35. AAA RULE 29.
36. AAA RULE 32.
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ings, but parties may have such a record made at their own expense. 37
Arbitrators' awards must be in writing38 but need not state any reasons or
findings supporting the decision.39 After an arbitrator has rendered an award,
federal and state arbitration statutes provide means for converting the award
into a judgment through judicial confirmation.4° Awards are subject to chal-
lenge only on extremely narrow grounds. The FAA provides that an arbitration
award, once rendered, is final and must be confirmed by a court unless the disap-
pointed party can demonstrate that 1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means, 2) the arbitrators exhibited evident partiality, 3) there
was gross misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence, 4) the arbi-
trators "exceeded their powers" or failed to render a final decision, or 5) the
arbitrators exhibited a "manifest disregard" for applicable law.4 Courts may
not upset an award merely because arbitrators made errors of fact or law.42
B. The Federal Arbitration Act: Recent Developments
Federal and state arbitration statutes provide the legal frameworks through
which courts enforce arbitration agreements and confirm arbitration awards.
The FAA applies to contracts affecting interstate, foreign, or maritime com-
merce.43 State arbitration laws are the means of enforcement for contracts in-
volving exclusively intrastate commerce. 44 Because the securities of public
corporations are traded on national markets and thus affect interstate com-
merce, this Article focuses on federal arbitration law under the FAA.
37. AAA RULE 23.
38. AAA RULE 42.
39. The AAA encourages its arbitrators not to issue written opinions explaining their decision
because such explanations "might open avenues for attack on the award by the losing party." Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, A Guide For Commercial Arbitrators at 16 ("No Written Opinion
Required")(undated).
40. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982); UNIF. ARBrTRATION AcT, § 11, 7 U.L.A.
133 (1985).
41. The first four of the bases of judicial review listed in the text are set forth explicitly in the
FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d). The fifth "manifest disregard" ground has been implied by the
courts. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2355 (1987).
42. See American Almond Prods. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales, 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir.
1944).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Certain contracts of employment are expressly excluded from FAA coverage.
Id. § 1. For example, § I excludes coverage of arbitrations involving workers in transportation in-
dustries. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.
1984). But conventional private arbitrations between white collar employees and employers are cov-
ered by the FAA so long as the employment relation affects interstate commerce. See GAF Corp. v.
Werner, 66 N.Y.2d 97, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312, 485 N.E.2d 977 (1985) (construing arbitration agreement
between CEO of public corporation and corporation under FAA), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083
(1986). Employment-related arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, meanwhile, is gov-
erned by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
44. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01, 203 (1956); Conley v. San
Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947). Every state has adopted a statute that assures that
arbitration agreements made within its borders will be enforceable. Shell, supra note 23, at 636 n.64.
State arbitration laws are also used to supplement the FAA in procedural areas on which the FAA is
silent. See, eg., Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S.
Ct. 1248 (1989) (holding that parties to interstate contract may elect to apply state arbitration law
procedure regarding stays even though FAA has no such procedure).
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The FAA's keystone is section 2.45 This provision makes enforceable any
"written provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration" any existing or future dispute.46 An arbitration
agreement may be repudiated only on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 47
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has revolutionized practice under
section 2. Three decisions by the Court are particularly relevant to the issues
addressed in this Article and illustrate the transformation of the FAA from a
procedural statute applicable only in federal court into a national charter favor-
ing liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements. First, in Southland Corp. v.
Keating48 the Court stated that the FAA preempts state rules limiting arbitra-
tion and embodies federal substantive law that must be enforced by both state
and federal courts.49 The Southland Court ruled that a California court was
required to enforce an arbitration clause between a franchisee and franchisor
even though the state franchise investment statute that formed the basis of the
franchisee's claim reserved to the franchisee the right to bring an action in court.
The Court insisted on arbitration of the state claim because Congress, in passing
the FAA, "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration." 50
In 1987 the Court reiterated its Southland holding in Perry v. Thomas.51 In
Perry the Court ordered a stockbroker to arbitrate a claim against his employer
for withheld commissions.52 The stockbroker argued that a state statute ex-
pressly gave workers the right to maintain a judicial action for wages and com-
missions "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate" 53 and that this very statute had been upheld by the Court against an
earlier claim of preemption by the federal labor laws. 54 The Court nevertheless
45. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 3 of the FAA provides that a federal district court, on motion
by any party, must stay its proceeding on any issue it determines to be within the scope of a valid
agreement to arbitrate. Id. § 3. If the parties are unable to agree on the selection of arbitrators, the
FAA also provides a means of resolving this question. Id. § 5.
46. Id. § 2.
47. Id. Section 2 incorporates state contract law, and both state and federal courts refer to state
common law to determine when an agreement to arbitrate is revocable. State courts are not free to
fashion special contract rules for the revocation of arbitration clauses, however, since such rules
would conflict with the overall policy of the FAA to favor enforcement of arbitration agreements.
See Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9 (1987). Moreover, the "revocation" limitation has
been interpreted narrowly by the Supreme Court. A claim that the contract containing the arbitra-
tion clause was induced by fraud will not defeat a motion to compel arbitration. Rather, the claimant
must demonstrate that the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced. See Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
48. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
49. The Court had earlier stated that the FAA constituted a body of "federal substantive law."
Id. at 12; see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
50. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
51. 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
52. Id. at 2523.
53. CAL. LABOR CODE § 229 (West 1971).




held that this statutory reservation of rights was a nullity under section 2 of the
FAA.55
Most recently, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,56 the
Court stated that federal statutory claims under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)57 and the civil liability provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)5 8 must be arbi-
trated when raised in cases by securities customers against their brokers. An-
swering arguments that arbitration of federal statutory rights would dilute
important protections provided by Congress, the Court stated that the FAA
"mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate [federal] statutory claims" 59
unless Congress explicitly exempts such claims from the FAA. The Court ex-
plained that it would deduce such exemptions from the text or legislative history
of the disputed statute or from "an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute's underlying purposes."' 60 Finding no such conflicts between the FAA
and either the 1934 Act or RICO, the Court ordered arbitration to proceed
under securities industry arbitration rules.61
As will be developed at more length in part II of this Article, these develop-
ments in the interpretation of the FAA have opened the door to the possibility of
arbitrating shareholder claims involving public corporations. Where formerly
the idea of arbitrating such disputes was almost unthinkable, it now appears that
arbitration of shareholder claims is a clear possibility as an alternative to
litigation. 6
2
II. ARBITRATION AND THE CLOSE CORPORATION
A. The Close Corporation 6
3
Although arbitration of shareholder claims is a novelty for the public cor-
55. Id. at 2525.
56. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
59. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2343, 2345-46; Shell, supra note 2, at 407-13.
62. Courts have traditionally been more willing to honor arbitration awards resulting from
agreements by parties to submit existing disputes to arbitrators than awards resulting from enforce-
ment ofpredispute arbitration clauses in contracts. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of this distinction in the context of
claims under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933); Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d
1209, 1215 (2d Cir.) (holding that arbitration of existing claims under federal antitrust laws does not
violate public policy), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972). The same receptive attitude would probably
hold for arbitrating corporate derivative disputes if parties chose to submit an existing derivative
claim to arbitrators. The new legal environment described in part II of this Article makes possible
the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements placed in corporate governing documents.
63. The term "close corporation" has come to have a special meaning in recent years under
statutes designed to give new rights to privately held businesses that elect "close corporation" status.
See, e.g., Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act, 39 Bus. LAW. 1031
(1983). In this Article, the term "close corporation" will be used interchangeably with and is
intended to mean the same thing as the more general term "closely held" or "privately held"
corporation.
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poration, this dispute resolution system is well established in the context of an-
other class of corporate entities, that of the privately held or "close"
corporation." The close corporation is the predominant form of corporate en-
terprise in the United States. Only about 4,000 corporations have securities
listed on a national securities exchange. 65 Another 4,000 corporations are un-
listed but report regularly to the SEC. 66 That leaves an estimated 2,500,000
corporations that do not fit into either of these regimes. 67 Close corporations
differ in four principal ways from their public counterparts. First, close corpora-
tions tend to be small businesses with few assets, whereas public corporations
tend to be very large multi-faceted enterprises. 68 Second, ownership and control
of the close corporation are often integrated. The stock of close corporations
tends to be held by a few individuals, most of whom are actively involved in the
management of the business.69 By contrast, public shareholders typically play
no role in the management of the corporation. Third, because the stockholders
are the managers, the stock of close corporations is usually "restricted," that is,
stockholders may not sell it without first offering the stock for sale to the re-
maining stockholders. It follows that, in contrast to the highly liquid nature of
the public shareholder's investment, there is no readily available market for
close corporation shares. The absence of such a market makes valuation of
shares difficult for both insiders and would-be purchasers, leads to conflicts over
dividend and distribution policies, and eliminates the discipline of an active mar-
ket for corporate control of the close corporation.7 0 Finally, the owners of close
corporations, while legally entitled to the benefit of limited liability, in practice
must frequently waive this protection to gain access to credit markets. 7 1 Thus,
shareholders of a close corporation, unlike public shareholders, risk losing con-
64. See R. KESSLER, NEW YORK CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 16.06 (1968); F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.16 (3d ed. 1988); Note, Arbitration as a Means of
Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1963).
65. Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a
Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 150 n.102 (Summer 1985).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 1.
POL. ECON. 1155, 1167 (1985) (finding that "[slize of firm, as measured by the market value of
equity, is negatively related to ownership concentration"). There are exceptions to every generaliza-
tion about corporations, however. Some very large corporations in the United States are still family-
owned close corporations. DeAngelo & DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership Of Voting Rights, 14 J.
FIN. ECON. 33, 61-68 (1985) (listing sample of companies). In addition, public corporations that "go
private' through leveraged buyouts become, for a period of time, giant close corporations held pri-
marily by large institutional investors and management. McCune & Van Kirk, Leveraged Buyouts
by Management, 16 REv. SEC. REG. 769 (1983); Anders, Leveraged Buy-Outs Make Some Compa-
nies Tougher Competitors, Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
69. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273
(1986).
70. Id. at 275-77.
71. H. HAYNSWORTH, SELECTING THE FORM OF A SMALL BusINEss ENTITY § 2.02 (1985)
("In many small corporations ... limited liability is more illusory than real because lenders will
often require that the principal shareholders guarantee payment of any loan to the corporation or
pledge their own assets as collateral for the loan."); cf. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 979, 985 (1971) (noting that contract creditors with small businesses must seek personal guar-
antees if they have questions about the solvency of the enterprise).
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siderably more than their investment should the enterprise fail.72
In the language of transaction cost economics, 73 close and public corpora-
tions represent polar extremes on an institutional scale of economic enterprise.
Close corporations are extremely "relational" in character. Many are family
businesses, 74 and most depend on the close cooperation of the shareholders for
success. Close corporation shareholders care almost as deeply about who owns
and runs the business as how it is being run. Public corporation shareholders, by
contrast, have little or no relationship with one another or the corporation be-
yond their shared hope for a positive investment return. The public share-
holder's relationship with the enterprise is mediated by the stock market, and
changes in the specific personnel who manage the corporation or in the list of
fellow shareholders matter little unless such changes affect the market price of
shares.
Surprisingly, in light of the facts that close and public corporations are en-
tirely distinct forms of business enterprise and close corporations greatly out-
number public corporations, states have until recently chosen to regulate all
corporations with a single set of rules drafted "almost exclusively" with large,
public corporations in mind. 75 Thus, close corporations have been subject to the
same corporate laws as public corporations for the greater part of the last 100
years and have had to cope, as best they could, with statutory norms that have
sometimes proven to be ill-suited to their economic needs. In recent years many
states have moved to provide close corporations with specially tailored statutory
rules. Legislatures have added flexibility to general corporation statutes, 76 legal
experts have drafted entire model codes dedicated solely to close corporations,
77
and courts have developed corporate common-law rules applicable only to close
corporations. 78 The story of how arbitration has come to be an acceptable rem-
72. Close corporations are often called "incorporated partnerships." See, eg., Suckewer & Hef-
tier, Disputes Among Shareholders and Directors in Closely Held Corporations, in ARBITRATION:
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE AND TORT CLAIMS 11 (A. Widiss ed. 1979); Hornstein, Arbi-
tration in Incorporated Partnerships, 18 ARE. J. 229 (1963). Unlike partnerships, however, corpora-
tions owned by more than one shareholder cannot be dissolved at will by any single owner. See, eg.,
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.02 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275, 355 (1983).
Thus, dissatisfied shareholders face the prospect of being locked into an investment they would pre-
fer to liquidate. This prospect leads many close corporation planners to advise shareholders in close
corporations to find a mutually agreeable means of exit from the corporation through buyouts.
Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining
Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 38 (1977).
73. See infra notes 302-27 and accompanying text (exploring transaction cost economics).
74. See Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 25, 55 (1987) (40% of 1984-85 involuntary dissolution
cases studied involved family-owned businesses).
75. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 268
(1967).
76. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-354 (1983); R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS IN-
CLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 514-15 (3d ed. 1986).
77. Model Statutory Close Corp. Supp., 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 1803-79 (3d ed.
1985).
78. See, eg., Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. App. 1981) (recognizing
special fiduciary duties of majority shareholders in close corporations in treatment of minority share-
holders), aff'd, 432 So. 2d 675 (Fla. App. 1983); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370
Mass. 842, 848-49, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1976) (same); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367
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edy for close corporations exemplifies this legal evolution.
B. Legalizing Arbitration: The New York Experience
Although commentators have questioned the utility of arbitration in the
close corporation setting,79 investors in close corporations have included arbitra-
tion clauses in negotiated shareholder agreements for many decades. 80 Re-
peated legislative and judicial reforms have been needed, however, to establish
arbitration as a legitimate means of dispute resolution in the close corporation
context. A brief history of the legal development of corporate arbitration in the
state of New York is illustrative of the hurdles that close corporation sharehold-
ers have had to overcome. Despite the differences between close and public cor-
porations, some of these same issues will arise when public corporations attempt
to use the arbitration remedy.
Prior to 1920 neither New York nor the United States had a statute regulat-
ing the use of arbitration. Hence, common-law rules regarding arbitration pro-
vided the only guidelines for its use. Under common-law arbitration rules,
agreements to arbitrate future disputes were deemed against public policy be-
cause they "ousted the jurisdiction of the courts." 81 Even agreements to arbi-
trate existing disputes were revocable at any time prior to the rendering of an
arbitration award.82 Thus, corporate arbitration in these early days was used
successfully only when the shareholders agreed to submit their existing dispute
to the arbitral forum and no party changed his mind prior to the moment when
the arbitrators made their award.
Mass. 578, 587, 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (1975) (same); Russell v. First York Savings Co., 218 Neb. 112,
116, 352 N.W.2d 871, 874 (1984) (same); 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 559-
60, 362 A.2d 78, 86 (1976) (same), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977).
79. Some commentators have said that arbitration is effective only for resolving "discrete, non-
recurring disagreements" and that it "cannot restore consensus." Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 72, at 37. Although there is truth in this assertion, case law reveals instances in which arbitra-
tion has been used more than once to resolve disputes in a single close corporation. See, e.g., In re
Denihan, 119 A.D.2d 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1986) (describing family corporation that had been
involved in a total of six arbitrations over a 15-year period), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 725, 504 N.E.2d 694,
572 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1987); cf In re Darman, 105 A.D.2d 1028, 483 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1984) (describing
the successful use of arbitrators to draft a comprehensive buy-sell agreement to govern ongoing
relationship among parties). Other commentators have counseled that arbitration poses risks for
close corporation shareholders because arbitrators may substitute their business judgment for that of
the managing shareholder or, worse still, may render a compromise award "that is unsatisfactory to
both sides." Haynsworth, supra note 74, at 29.
80. See, eg., In re Carl, 263 A.D. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1942); Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. &
Taylor Inc., 242 A.D. 852, 275 N.Y.S. 221 (1934). Typically, close corporation arbitration clauses
are found in shareholder agreements entered into at the formation stage of the enterprise but not,
curiously, in corporate charters. Research reveals no American cases involving an arbitration provi-
sion found solely in the charter of a close corporation. However, commentators have for years
recommended that arbitration clauses be placed in both shareholder agreements and the articles of
incorporation of new close corporations. See, eg., Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the
Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040, 1054 (1950); Kessler, Arbitration of Intra-Corporate
Disputes Under New York Laws, 19 ARE. J. 1, 19 (1964). It seems likely therefore that some corpo-
rate charters have contained such provisions.
81. Shell, supra note 23, at 635.
82. Shell, supra note 23, at 635; see also Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the FederalArbl-




Even after the passage in 1920 of New York's landmark arbitration stat-
ute,83 which mandated judicial enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes, the New York Court of Appeals frustrated attempts by shareholders to
bypass the courts. In In re Fletcher8 4 the court held that an agreement among
close corporation shareholders for arbitrators to determine the transfer price of
closely held shares was not enforceable under the New York statute because
valuations and appraisals were not "controversies" subject to statutory arbitra-
tion.85 The New York legislature overruled Fletcher in 1952 by amending its
arbitration statute to cover "questions arising out of valuations, appraisals or
other controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent
to or independent of any issue between the parties."
86
Similarly, the New York courts were reluctant to approve the use of arbi-
tration for control and management disputes within close corporations because
such controversies were "nonjusticiable" matters that could not be heard in a
court.87 Once again the New York legislature amended the arbitration statute
to make such disputes arbitrable "without regard to the justiciable character of
the controversy."88
83. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980)).
84. 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924).
85. Id. at 448, 143 N.E. at 250-51. The 1920 statute made agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes specifically enforceable by providing that two or more persons may "contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the contract." Act of Apr. 19,
1920, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804.
86. Act of Apr. 15, 1952, ch. 757, 1952 N.Y. Laws 1632 (amending Civil Practice Act, ch. 925
§ 1448, 1920 N.Y. Laws 486 (replaced by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7501 (McKinney 1981))); see
O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV.
L. Rav. 786, 796-97 (1954). The present New York arbitration statute omits this language because it
was felt that the broad language of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R_ § 7501 clearly encompassed valuation
and appraisal questions. R. KESSLER, supra note 64, § 16.09, at 497 (citing legislative history).
87. See In re Burkin, I N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). In Burkin the
New York Court of Appeals held that a broad arbitration agreement between shareholders of a close
corporation did not cover a dispute over removal of a shareholder-director because New York did
not recognize a private right of action to remove a corporate director, and the state arbitration
statute suggested that controversies were arbitrable only if they "might be the subject of an action."
Id. at 571, 136 N.E.2d at 864, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (quoting Act of Apr. 15, 1952, ch. 757, 1952
N.Y. Laws 1632 (amending Civil Practice Act, ch. 925 § 1448, 1920 N.Y. Laws 486 (replaced by
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7501 (McKinney 1981)))); see also In re Ades, 12 Misc. 2d 913, 914, 177
N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1958) (motion to compel arbitration to remove director denied since only attor-
ney general has right to remove director); In re Scuderi, 265 A.D. 1054, 1054, 39 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423
(1943) (refusing to permit arbitration regarding the validity of the election of a member of the board
because the election "was governed by the by-laws of the corporation," not the shareholders'
agreement).
88. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7501 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1988). There is evidence that
this change to the New York arbitration statute was in process before the Burkin decision was
handed down and was responsive to a general sense that the restrictive language in the statute served
no justifiable purpose. Note, supra note 64, at 279 n.72. In the famous case of Ringling Brothers,
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947), the
Delaware court exhibited a reluctance to give full effect to an arbitration agreement between close
corporation shareholders regarding the election, rather than the removal, of directors. In Ringling a
group of shareholders making up a majority block entered into a voting agreement that provided for
arbitration in the event of a dispute. Id. at 614, 53 A.2d at 443. After a dispute arose over the
election of directors and an arbitrator had rendered a decision, the losing party refused to vote as
directed by the arbitrator. Id. at 616, 53 A.2d at 444. The court recognized the validity of the
arbitration agreement, but refused to require the shareholder to vote as the arbitrator directed. See
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A third obstacle to the enforcement of arbitration agreements arose from
the rigid statutory requirement that corporate affairs be managed solely by a
board of directors. 89 Courts have refused to permit shareholders to use govern-
ance structures, including arbitration, more tailored to their individual needs90
on the ground that such structures "sterilize the board." 91
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Long Park Inc. v. Trenton-
New Brunswick Theatres Co.92 is a classic application of the sterilization doc-
trine in the arbitration context. In Long Park the court examined a close corpo-
ration governance structure under which the shareholders (all of whom were
corporations) designated one of their number to manage the affairs of the en-
tity.93 The nonmanaging shareholders were granted the right to apply to an
id. at 623, 53 A.2d at 448. This resulted in the total frustration of the voting agreement and in
legislative action in Delaware and elsewhere to make such agreements specifically enforceable. In
New York the result in Ringling has been legislatively overruled by § 620(a) of the corporation act,
which recognizes the right of shareholders in a close corporation to agree to vote their stock by
means of any agreed procedure, including arbitration in which the arbitrator is given irrevocable
proxies. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 620(a), 609(f)(5) (McKinney 1986).
89. Eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (1983) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."); REViSED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT
§ 8.01(b) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any
limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation."). Several reasons have been advanced to explain
why the board of directors is the statutorily mandated institution of choice in corporate governance.
One explanation for the board, based on an economic understanding of the origins of the modern
corporation, views this institution as a means of centralizing management and accountability in
order to facilitate the raising of capital. Manne, supra note 75, at 260-61. Another explanation,
derived from transaction cost economics, explains the board as a contractual governance structure
protecting the investment expectations of the corporation's residual risk bearers (equity holders) and
the owners of firm-specific human capital (senior managers). Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L.J. 1197, 1209-11, 1215-20 (1984).
90. See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres, 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313,
119 N.E. 559 (1918).
91. See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918); H. HENN & J. ALEX-
ANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 267 (3d ed. 1983); Bul-
loch, Shareholder Agreements in Closely Held Corporations: Is Sterilization an Issue?, 59 TEMPLE
L.Q. 61, 62 (1986).
92. 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948). The New York courts have exhibited confusion on
the question of when an arbitration agreement sterilizes the board. In one early case involving the
removal of a shareholder as an officer and director of a close corporation, a New York court refused
to enforce an arbitration agreement on the grounds that "the duty of the board of directors to man-
age the affairs of the corporation in accordance with their best judgment would be wholly abrogated
in all cases" if arbitration prevailed. In re Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 A.D. 52, 56, 276 N.Y.S.
153, 157 (1934). Less than 10 years later, however, another New York court held on nearly identical
facts that the removal of a shareholder as an officer and employee of a close corporation was prop-
erly subject to arbitration under a shareholder agreement. Martocci v. Martocci, 2 Misc. 2d 330, 42
N.Y.S.2d 222, aff'd, 266 A.D. 840, 43 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1944). Other New York cases have approved
arbitration involving a variety of management issues without regard to the sterilization issue. See,
e.g., In re Lane, 50 N.Y.2d 864, 407 N.E.2d 1337, 430 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1980) (compensation and em-
ployment dispute); In re Glekel, 30 N.Y.2d 93, 281 N.E.2d 171 (1972) (agreement regarding regis-
tration of shares for a public offering); In re Groval Knitted Fabrics, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 513, 339
N.Y.S.2d 58 (1971) (dispute over termination of salary and "freeze out" of minority shareholder),
aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 796, 291 N.E.2d 395, 339 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1972); Crandall v. Master-Eagle Photoen-
graving Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 475, 211 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1960) (claim of excessive compensation being
paid to manager-shareholders), aff'd, 13 A.D.2d 726, 217 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1961).
93. Long Park, Inc., 297 N.Y. at 177, 77 N.E.2d at 634.
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arbitrator should they wish to take over the management of the corporation
themselves.94 The court held that this attempt to divest the board of its author-
ity both to name and remove the management of the company "sterilized" the
board in violation of New York law.
95
The sterilization issue was finally put to rest when the New York legislature
passed legislation in 1965 that overruled Long Park.96 Section 620(b) of the
New York corporation law provides that, so long as all shareholders approve
and the clause is placed in the certificate of incorporation, provisions transfer-
ring "all or any part" of the management authority in a close corporation to
"one or more shareholders or to one or more persons or corporations to be se-
lected by him or them" are legal despite being restrictive of board discretion. 97
This statutory safe harbor sanctions agreements to arbitrate virtually any sort of
business policy dispute in close corporations.
98
A fourth close corporation arbitration problem that has vexed the New
York courts is whether shareholder derivative claims may be arbitrated. A
number of early New York cases suggested that arbitration of derivative suits
94. Id. at 178, 77 N.E.2d at 634.
95. Id. at 179, 77 N.E.2d at 635.
96. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1986). In addition, also in 1965, a New York
appellate court, later affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, enforced arbitration between two
owners of a close corporation over an important, but arguably conventional, business decision. In
Application of Vogel, 25 A.D.2d 212, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 589, 224 N.E.2d
738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1967), the two 50% owners of a close corporation were split over whether
their corporation should exercise an option to purchase a warehouse that the corporation leased.
One of the owners, Vogel, had a conflict of interest in that he owned another corporation that would
be adversely affected if the option were exercised. The other owner demanded arbitration of the
dispute pursuant to an agreement between the two men and the corporation. The court enforced the
arbitration clause, holding that the exercise of the option was a "fundamental" matter that involved
the "continued [corporate] existence" and that both parties were aware that the option might be-
come an issue when they signed the arbitration agreement. Quoting a treatise on New York arbitra-
tion law, the court noted that arbitrators could be useful in resolving disputes involving "'business
judgment so long as they are not required to assume a continuing burden of management." 25
A.D.2d at 216, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (quoting 8 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEw YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE § 7501.18). However, the court indicated that, absent compliance with § 620, it
might not enforce an arbitration clause when the dispute related to routine matters of business judg-
ment. Id. at 216, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
97. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1986). The requirement that sterilizing provi-
sions be included in the certificate of incorporation has not been strictly enforced on the theory that,
when there is no dispute that all the shareholders agreed to the provision, the certificate can be
judicially reformed to comport with the agreement. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 102-03, 405
N.E.2d 681, 685-86, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1980) (interpreting Delaware law but stating that the
same result would obtain in New York); Adler v. Svingos, 80 A.D.2d 764, 765, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719,
721 (1981) (upholding unanimous consent agreement among shareholders even though agreement
not placed in certificate of incorporation). Some states, including Delaware, permit sterilizing agree-
ments in close corporations entered into by a majority of the shareholders. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-307
(1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7210 (1981); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1381 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
98. R. KESSLER, supra note 64, § 16.06, at 483-84; F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 64,
§ 9.16, at 63-65; Coffee, supra note 12, at 967-68. Other states have not been so indirect in approving
the use of arbitration to resolve intracorporate disputes and have explicitly approved the use of
arbitration by close corporation shareholders. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-311 (1987); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-206 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-339 (West 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 1211-11(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §§ 616(4),
617(3), 618(1)(F) (1964) (appraisal, voting agreements, management agreements); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.457, subd. 2(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (1982); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.591(C)(11) (Page 1985 & Supp. 1987).
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violated public policy.99 Other cases found a more technical means of avoiding
arbitration by focusing on the fact that the corporation, on whose behalf the
derivative claim is brought, was not a party to the shareholder arbitration
agreement. lO
Legal commentators quickly devised a means of solving the technical prob-
lem: have the corporation sign the arbitration agreement.' 0 1 As to the public
policy argument, recent cases have refused to draw a distinction between close
corporations and their shareholders and have thus permitted derivative suits to
be arbitrated.' 0 2 These courts have found that derivative claims of managerial
waste and misappropriation are, realistically, disputes among the shareholders,
not between the corporation and the alleged wrongdoer. The public policy of
litigating derivative claims has therefore now given way to the policy of encour-
aging arbitration.'
0 3
A final problem involving the arbitration of close corporation disputes con-
cerns dissolution. Early New York cases refused to enforce arbitration when the
stockholder resisting arbitration sought to petition for dissolution of the corpo-
ration.1°# Subsequent decisions, however, have made clear that arbitration can
be compelled even in the face of a petition for dissolution"' 5 and, indeed, that
99. See, eg., Pfeiffer v. Berke, 4 Misc. 2d 918, 920, 121 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777 (1953) ("An agree-
ment to arbitrate the issues arising in a shareholder's derivative suit [is] unenforcible [sic] as against
public policy."); Application of Diamond, 80 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (1948), ("The issues involved in the
stockholder's derivative action are not referable to arbitration under the contract, and... [even if
they were], they would be unenforceable as against public policy .... "), aff'd, 274 A.D. 762, 79
N.Y.S.2d 924 (1948); Lumsden v. Lumsden Bros. & Taylor, Inc., 242 A.D. 852, 275 N.Y.S. 221, 222
(1934) ("It does not appear how there could be an agreement to arbitrate a controversy of this nature
made in advance .... "). But see In re Carl, 263 A.D. 887, 32 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1942) (enforcing
arbitration agreement on petition by defendant in derivative action); Note, supra note 64, at 281-83.
100. See Hotcaveg v. Lightman, 27 Misc. 2d 573, 574, 211 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534 (1960); Diamond,
80 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67. Corporate arbitration clauses are frequently contained in shareholders'
agreements to which the corporations are not parties. Thus, there is no written agreement to arbi-
trate binding the corporation.
101. See F. O'NEAL & I. THOMPSON, supra note 64, § 9.19, at 86.
102. Siegal v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 13, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (1964) ("From a logical and
practical viewpoint, the conclusion is irresistible that in a close corporation a dispute concerning acts
of waste is a matter involving stockholders inter se. To say that the corporate entity is the real party
is to disregard reality.")
103. Id. ("On broad principles ofpracticality, the courts should encourage arbitration to dispose
of the problems created by disputes within close corporations. Arbitration avoids the delay inherent
in litigation and weeds out from our courts the very type of time consuming dispute that we have in
the instant case."). See also Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Glaser, 92 A.D.2d 850, 852, 460 N.Y.S.2d
575, 577 (Silverman, J., dissenting in part) (derivative claims of misappropriation, conversion and
waste of income and corporate assets held suitable for arbitration), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 577, 454 N.E.2d
124, 467 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1983); In re Lane, 70 A.D.2d 838, 839, 418 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (1979) ("Arbitra-
tion of claims of a derivative nature are [sic] not against public policy in a close corporation."), aff'd,
50 N.Y.2d 864, 407 N.E.2d 1337, 430 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1980).
104. In re Cohen, 183 Misc. 1034, 1035, 52 N.Y.S.2d 671, 671 (1944) ("The disputes between
these parties... may be decided by arbitration, but arbitration cannot compel a stockholder holding
[50%] of the stock to desist from seeking its dissolution. No stockholder is required to continue in a
state of constant legal warfare with the remaining [50%] interest."), aff'd, 269 A.D. 663, 53
N.Y.S.2d 467 (1945); Matter of Becopa Glove Mills, Inc., 122 N.Y.L.J. 1790 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Matter
of Dome Trading Corp., 114 N.Y.L.J. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Matter of Hess, 108 N.Y.L.J. 555 (Sup.
Ct. 1942); Note, supra note 64, at 283-84 & n.96.
105. See In re Levy, 79 A.D.2d 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1980); In re Moskowitz, 30 A.D.2d 820,
292 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1968).
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arbitrators have broad authority to order both dissolution and buyouts as reme-
dies in arbitration.106
In summary, after nearly seventy years of legal evolution, arbitration is now
utilized in New York as a close corporation remedy for virtually every kind of
corporate dispute. Indeed, detailed case administration statistics compiled by
the American Arbitration Association reveal that between 1984 and August
1988 the AAA received over one thousand claims and counterclaims worth over
$118,000,000 under its case administration category dealing with close corpora-
tion disputes. These claims include disputes regarding stock valuation and ap-
praisal, allegations of breach of contract, mismanagement, misrepresentation,
wrongful discharge, and breach of fiduciary duty.107
The few exceptions to the present pro-arbitration policy that may remain in
New York or elsewhere are now subject to a new challenge. As noted earlier,
the Supreme Court has recently reinterpreted the FAA as preempting attempts
by the states to preclude access to the arbitral forum.10 8 When parties can con-
vince a court that their close corporation dispute involves interstate com-
merce,10 9 they may be able to bypass even express statutory restrictions on
arbitration, such as the New York requirement that an arbitration clause appear
in the charter.1 10 Not only do FAA standards facilitate enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses, federal law also supports confirmation of corporate arbitration
awards involving attorneys' fees, punitive and multiple damages, and other ex-
traordinary relief that might be prohibited under state law.111
106. In re Denihan, 119 A.D.2d 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1986) (ordering arbitration of dissolution
dispute), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 725, 504 N.E.2d 694, 512 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1987); In re Berman, 31 Misc. 2d
830, 222 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1961) (upholding arbitrator dissolution award); Application of Hega Knit-
ting Mills, 124 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1953) (same); In re Astey, 19 Misc. 2d 1059, 189 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1959)
(upholding arbitrator order requiring buy-out); cf In re Darman, 105 A.D.2d 1028, 483 N.Y.S.2d
469 (1984) (upholding arbitration award that included comprehensive buy-sell agreement and corpo-
rate control provision).
107. Letter from Barbara L. Brady, AAA Case Administration Department Coordinator, to
Professor G. Richard Shell (Sept. 1, 1988) (on file with author) (attaching computer data printout on
shareholder cases filed for period 1984 through August 1988).
108. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
109. Many close corporations involve wholly intrastate commerce. Thus, state arbitration law
would be the correct source of rules for interpreting arbitration agreements involving such entities.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. But when equity funds have been raised from out-of-
state residents, when the corporation transacts business across state lines, or where the dispute at
issue involves the use of interstate mails, telephones, or other means of communication, it is arguable
that the arbitration provision is in a contract that involves interstate commerce and that the FAA
should apply. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Indus., 231 Ga. 329, 201 S.E.2d 452
(1973); Burke County Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408, 279 S.E.2d
816 (1981); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 199, 597 P.2d 380 (1979). It could also be
argued that an arbitration clause, viewed as a governance device, should be interpreted according to
the corporate and arbitration laws of the state in which the entity is incorporated. The "internal
affairs doctrine" declares that corporations should be subject in their internal governance to the law
of only one state, the state of incorporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 91, § 86. The
internal affairs doctrine, however, is a choice of law rule distinguishing among sources of state law.
The question of which arbitration statute to apply, by contrast, is an issue of federalism, involving
the supremacy of federal over state law in matters involving congressional statutes that regulate
interstate commerce. Thus, so long as the close corporation affects interstate commerce, the FAA
should apply to the enforcement of any arbitration provision and the confirmation of any award.
110. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1986).
111. For example, the Uniform Arbitration Act, enacted in many states, forbids the award of
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III. ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES: LEGAL ISSUES
AND PUBLIC POLICIES
Legal developments over the past four decades have transformed arbitra-
tion of close corporation disputes from a hotly contested issue into a matter of
everyday practice. With the Supreme Court's decisions in Southland,
112
Perry,113 and McMahon,114 shareholders in public corporations stand at the
threshold of a similar legal revolution.
115
A. Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Governance
Given the seeming advantages of arbitration and the Supreme Court's en-
thusiastic endorsement of this dispute resolution mechanism, what objection
could there be to using arbitrators to settle the complaints that public sharehold-
ers bring against their corporation and its managers and directors? The answer
to this question lies in the existing legal model of state control over the large
corporation. Lawsuits brought by disgruntled shareholders against incumbent
managers and directors occupy a prominent place in the current model of public
corporate governance. This model would be profoundly altered by the use of
arbitrators in place of judges to resolve public shareholder claims.
Most legal scholars agree that rules of law play an important role in regu-
lating the conduct of public corporations and their managers. 116 In the large
attorneys' fees in arbitration. See Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 401 N.E.2d 839
(1980); UNIF. ARBrrRATION Acr § 10, 7 U.L.A. 131 (1985) ("Unless otherwise provided in the
agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including
counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award.").
The FAA has been interpreted to contain no such prohibition on awards of fees. Willoughby Roof-
ing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1lth
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Shell, The Power To Punisk Authority of Arbitrators to Award Multiple
Damages and Attorneys' Fees, 72 MAss. L. R v. 26, 31 (1987). Similarly, state law sometimes pro-
hibits arbitration awards of punitive damages. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353
N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). Once again, the FAA has been interpreted to contain no such
limitation. See Willoughby, 598 F. Supp. at 353; Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration-
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REv. 953 (1986).
112. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
115. Indeed, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has speculated that arbitration of public shareholder
claims is the "issue for the future" for shareholder litigation. Coffee, supra note 12, at 953. See also
Ribstein, Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Business Roundtable/Emory University Law and
Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71 COR-
NELL L. REv. 357, 388-89 (1986) (Professor Daniel Fischel remarking that "I've been troubled for a
long time about why there isn't more of that type of dispute resolution [arbitration]. So I think it is
interesting to have some discussion about what the costs are of [arbitration] so that people don't use
it more frequently.").
116. For the monitoring of corporate managers, economists tend to favor reliance on markets
rather than mandatory rules of law. See, e,.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Mar-
kets and Corporate Law, 51 U. Cal. L. REv. 1061 (1984); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revis-
ited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913,
944 (1982) ("The function of corporation law.., is rather limited. Apart from minimizing transac-
tion costs and possibly facilitating the operation of market forces that discipline management, corpo-
ration law has little role to play."); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). By contrast, more traditional
legal scholars tend to suspect that markets lack the efficiency to provide adequate regulation and
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public corporation, control over corporate assets is centralized in the hands of
relatively few corporate policymakers.1 17 These decision makers may have some
stake in the company, but the majority of shares are owned by people and insti-
tutions that have little interest in directly managing the business. Control of the
corporation is therefore effectively separated from ownership of corporate as-
sets.1 18 This situation creates inevitable "agency costs" in that managers have
opportunities to dissipate corporate assets through mismanagement and to mis-
appropriate shareholders' wealth through a variety of both overt and subtle self-
servihg strategies.' 19
The conventional wisdom is that legal rules are needed to protect share-
holders from such managerial opportunism. -Shareholders thus have two major
legally sanctioned means, in addition to their right to simply sell their shares and
reinvest their money,120 to influence management of the publicly held corpora-
tion. First and foremost, shareholders have the right to vote in corporate af-
fairs. 12 1 The highest decision makers in the corporation-the members of the
therefore lean toward more legal restrictions. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1404 (1985) (economic theory of
corporation sometimes "serves the ideological function of legitimating substantially unaccountable
managerial discretion to determine corporate activities and to serve itself at the expense of inves-
tors"); Cox, supra note 9, at 752; Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law and Principles of Cor-
porate Government & Structure: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law
Reform, 68 MINN. L. REv. 53, 56-72 (1983). Both groups, however, recognize the need for legal
regulation under some circumstances. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982) (recognizing need for shareholder suits to deter and compensate
for "one-shot" frauds) with Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 326-27 (1981) (advocating strength-
ening of shareholder suit to deter violations of all fiduciary duties) and Cohn, Demise of the Direc-
tor's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment
Rule, 62 TEx. L. REv. 591, 596-602 (1983) (demonstrating that shareholder derivative actions are
currently ineffective and calling for reforms to strengthen remedies used by courts).
117. The statutory model posits that this decision making authority rests with the board of direc-
tors. See supra note 89. In fact, however, the board is frequently controlled to a greater or lesser
extent by top management in the corporation. Top management sits on the board, sets the agenda
for most meetings, and controls the flow of information to board members. See, eg., Brudney, The
Independent Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 612, 633-34
(1982); Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer 1985).
118. This situation was brought to the attention of legal and political commentators in the 1930s
by Professors Berle and Means. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). A great deal of modem corporate law theory and practice derives from
the "separation of ownership and control" thesis stated in this classic book. In recent years, econo-
mists have criticized both the data and the analysis of this work. See, eg., Stigler & Friedland, The
Literature of Economic" The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 249 (1983) (demon-
strating that management salaries in firms with concentrated ownership were no different from those
firms with diffuse ownership during the periods studied by Berle and Means); Demsetz & Lehn,
supra note 68, at 1175-76 (arguing that firms with diffuse ownership structures are no less profitable
than firms with concentrated ownership structures and therefore the separation of ownership from
control does not affect management performance).
119. See Brudney, supra note 116, at 1427-43.
120. The shareholder's option simply to sell out when the shareholder disagrees with manage-
ment policy is popularly known as the "Wall Street Rule." Note, Corporate Governance and the
Shareholders' Derivative Action: Rules and Remedies for Implementing the Monitoring Model, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 627, 635 & n.40 (1982).
121. In the context of public corporations the voting machinery of corporate governance is
strictly regulated by federal rules regarding proxy solicitations. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SE-
CURITIEs REGULATION 449-97 (2d ed. 1988). Shareholders also have the right under state law to
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board of directors-are elected to office by a vote of the shareholders and may be
removed at regular intervals through new elections. 122 In addition, shareholder
approval is needed to implement certain fundamental changes in the corporate
charter and economic structure.
1 2 3
The right of shareholders in a public corporation to vote on such matters as
the election and removal of directors is important for two reasons. First, it gives
shareholders a voice in the ongoing management of the business insofar as major
decisions affecting the identity of the enterprise are concerned. Second, it makes
possible the aggregation of voting blocks by interested parties outside the corpo-
ration who think they can improve the return on investment offered by incum-
bent managers. This latter use of the voting system is most visible in the context
of the hostile tender offer conducted pursuant to federal and state law.
1 24
Despite the importance of shareholders' right to vote, this control mecha-
nism is viewed by many as an ineffective governance device, and some have said
that corporate "democracy" is simply a myth.125 Critics point out that widely
dispersed public shareholders are unable, as a practical matter, to combine their
votes, and that management is therefore in full control of the election machin-
ery.12 6 The utility of takeovers as a governance device has been called into ques-
tion in recent years by the widespread, successful use by target company
managers of defensive tactics such as "poison pills" 127 and "shark repellent"
charter amendments 128 to defeat hostile takeover attempts. 12 9 State antitake-
inspect the corporate books and records under certain circumstances. Eg., REVISED MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORP. ACT § 16.02.
122. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.03; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1983).
123. Eg., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT §§ 10.01-10.09 (charter amendments), 11.03
(mergers), 12.02 (sale of assets other than in the ordinary course). Shareholders also have a right to
an appraisal and repurchase of their shares by the corporation under certain circumstances. Id.
§§ 13.01-13.03.
124. The subject of hostile tender offers is complex and well beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that managers are rendered accountable to shareholders to some
degree because of the possibility that an acquiring firm will seek control of the company through
share purchases. See, eg., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN.
110 (1965); Coffee, supra note 6; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116. The Williams Act governs
hostile tender offers on the federal level. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1981). Note, SEC
Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 580 (1987). State takeover statutes
also regulate this area. The Supreme Court has held that the Williams Act does not preempt all state
attempts to regulate takeovers. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
125. Note, supra note 120, at 635 n.40; Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder
Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1988) (testing sample of 100 proxy contests and finding significant
evidence that shareholder monitoring is inefficient).
126. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 118, at 47-116; Brudney, supra note 116, at 1412 n.23;
see also C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
47-48 (1975) (discussing fragmentation of public corporation shareholdings and the resulting self-
perpetuation of management); Branson, The American Law Institute Principles Of Corporate Govern-
ance And The Derivative Action: A View From The Other Side, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 411
n.68 (1986) (same).
127. A "poison pill" is a special type of redeemable option issued to shareholders in a target
corporation that gives the shareholders the right to purchase shares in either the target or the acquir-
ing firm at a greatly discounted price in the event of a hostile takeover. R. CLARK, supra note 19,
§ 13.6, at 574; see Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 377 (1988) (finding that adoption of poison pill is associated with declines in stock price of
subject corporation).
128. "Shark repellent" charter amendments generally make it more difficult for a hostile acquir-
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over legislation has also made hostile takeovers more difficult.130 Such imper-
fections in corporate democracy have thus focused attention on the second
means of direct shareholder control over managers: the shareholder suit.
Shareholders have the right to sue the board and corporate officers for al-
leged violations of legal duty. 131 Members of boards of directors and officers of
corporations are governed by legal standards of conduct, called fiduciary duties,
that set the threshold of acceptable behavior for the discharge of corporate of-
fices. Corporate directors have two fiduciary duties to the corporation: a duty
of care and a duty of loyalty. 132 The duty of care requires directors to be rea-
sonable and prudent in their decision making and to give business matters an
appropriate degree of attention before exercising their authority. 1 3 3 The duty of
loyalty differs significantly from the duty of care. The duty of loyalty requires
directors to refrain from self-dealing (such as misappropriating corporate oppor-
tunities) and conflict-of-interest transactions unless such activities are approved
by and are fair to the corporation. 134 Virtually the only source of cases that give
operational meaning to these fiduciary standards are judicial opinions rendered
ing firm to gain control of the board of a target company even though the acquiror may have ob-
tained a majority of the target firm's shares. Charter provisions staggering the terms of board
members and increasing the number of shareholder votes needed to replace board members are
examples of such amendments. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 13.6, at 576; see DeAngelo & Rice,
Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983) (finding
negative, but statistically insignificant abnormal stock returns when corporation announces proposed
antitakeover charter amendments).
129. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981).
130. Since the CTS decision, more than one-half the states have enacted some form of-statute
that imposes rules and limitations on hostile takeovers of companies incorporated within their juris-
dictions. Hanks & Stec, Charting the Rising Tide of State Takeover Legislation, 2 INSIGHTs 22, 22-
23 (1988) (listing states). See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983 & Supp. 1988); Butler,
Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 365; Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HIARv. L. REV. 96 (1987); Macey, State Anti-Takover
Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467; Posen, The New Round of State
Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89 (1987).
131. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.1; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 91, § 360, at
1044.
132. Special Project, Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L. REv. 599, 606 (1987).
133. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 8.30(a)(2) (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Special
Project, supra note 132, at 606-13. In practice, courts consider themselves less qualified than busi-
ness people in making business decisions and are reluctant to interfere in ordinary business affairs in
response to claims that a board has violated the duty of care. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) ("courts are ill equipped... to evaluate
what are and must be essentially business judgments"); Special Project, supra note 132, at 616.
Thus, unless a shareholder can demonstrate that directors have exhibited "gross negligence" or
worse, boards may invoke a legal doctrine known as the "business judgment rule" under which a
court will simply refuse to review the substance of a business decision. Special Project, supra note
132, at 613-18.
134. Special Project, supra note 132, at 623-28. In contrast with the duty the care, judicial
review of breaches of the duty of loyalty is strict, and corporate managers are not entitled to protec-
tion under the business judgment rule for such offenses. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221
(Del. Ch. 1976); Guth v. Loft, Inc. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). Directors
must satisfy a court that conflict-of-interest dealings were approved by a majority of disinterested
directors or shareholders and/or that the transaction was objectively fair to the corporation. See,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 310(a)(2),(b)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1987); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144
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in response to shareholder lawsuits against management. 135
The corporation itself has a primary right to enforce directors' and officers'
fiduciary duties.13 6 The corporation, however, may choose not to vindicate its
rights. The company may not know of the violations; it may simply look the
other way when violations come to light; or the wrongdoers may have control of
the decision apparatus for filing such lawsuits. State corporation laws therefore
provide individual shareholders with a remedy to sue "derivatively" on behalf of
the corporation if the shareholder believes that directors and officers have
breached a fiduciary duty.13 7 Shareholders may file a derivative action in the
name of the corporation to seek relief for alleged wrongs to the enterprise com-
mitted by directors and officers.
138
To a large extent, attorneys rather than shareholders are the real parties in
interest in derivative actions involving public corporations. 139 Except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, no individual shareholder stands to recover more
than nominal damages in most derivative suits.140 Because no individual share-
holder has an incentive to sue, special rules are needed to encourage such ac-
tions. 14 1 The American legal system has answered this need through rules
regarding the award of attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs' lawyers. When a
derivative action results in a monetary settlement or judgment, the plaintiffs'
attorneys are entitled to a substantial fee drawn from the common fund created
by the successful litigation. 142 It is the lawyers' pursuit of a lucrative fee, there-
(1983 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. CODE § 713(a) (McKinney 1986); REVISED MODEL Busi-
NESS CORP. ACT § 8.31(a) (1984); Special Project, supra note 132, at 624.
135. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.9, at 663 ("The kinds of suits that are derivative in nature
include most cases based on breach of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.").
136. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.2, at 640 (pointing out that shareholders must make a de-
mand on the corporation before proceeding with a derivative action and that "[i]f the directors
respond affirmatively, as by suing the parties that allegedly caused harm to the corporation or taking
other corrective action, their action usually precludes a shareholder-initiated suit.").
137. Note, supra note 120, at 637 n.43 (listing state statutes that permit derivative suits). Deriv-
ative suits frequently involve claims against officers and directors, but shareholders may also press
claims against third parties such as customers and suppliers when the corporation has such claims
but has failed to pursue them. See, eg., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
138. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.1, at 639-40. In addition to the derivative action for wrongs
done to the corporation, the shareholder may also bring a direct action for damages or injunctive
relief when some activity by the corporation or its decision makers causes direct injury to the share-
holder. Id. at 640. Such actions can be styled as either individual suits or as class actions when the
same injury is alleged to have been suffered by a group of similarly situated shareholders. Id. In
practice, there is no bright line that distinguishes between direct and derivative actions. Id. § 15.9,
at 662. A shareholder who wishes to sue a manager for having defrauded him into buying or selling
shares must usually bring an individual or class action. Id. at 663. A shareholder who wishes to
allege that a director usurped a corporate opportunity, by contrast, must probably sue derivatively
because the injury is primarily suffered by the corporation. Id. Shareholder class actions are a
complex form of litigation in their own right. Such suits require plaintiffs to 1) obtain class certifica-
tion; 2) secure judicial approval of suitable class representatives; 3) fulfill complicated notice proce-
dures; and 4) obtain judicial approval of settlements. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
139. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in
the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHL L. REv. 877, 882-85 (1987); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff'
Attorney, supra note 10, at 669, 677; Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 20, at 376-77.
140. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.8, at 659.
141. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.8, at 659.
142. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1980) (discussing "common fund"
doctrine); R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.8, at 660; Hornstein, The Counsel Fees in Stockholders'
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fore, that motivates most shareholder litigation in the public corporation
arena. 143
Because of a fear that shareholders' attorneys will abuse this remedy by
filing "strike suits" based on frivolous allegations, both state and federal law
stipulate a number of procedural hurdles the plaintiff must overcome before pro-
ceeding with a derivative action.144 First, the plaintiff must have been a share-
holder at the time the wrong in question occurred. 145 Second, in about one-
third of the states, the plaintiff must post a security bond to insure the corpora-
tion against expenses should the claim prove to be without merit.1 46 Third, the
plaintiff must give notice of the suit to the corporation by making a demand on
the board of directors or the shareholders to pursue the claim before the plaintiff
can pursue the suit. 147 Such a demand is "excused," however, when the share-
holder can prove that, due to direct conflicts of interest on the part of a majority
of the board, a demand would be futile.' 48 Upon receipt of a demand or notice
Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1939). It has been estimated that plaintiffs' attorneys
receive roughly 20% of the judgment or settlement amount in derivative and class action cases. R.
CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.8, at 661-62.
143. Because plaintiffs' attorneys take a risk that they will lose the suit and recover nothing, they
tend to select and file a "portfolio" of lawsuits in the hopes that the cases in which they recover a fee
will pay for the cases in which they recover nothing. Coffee, supra note 10, at 704-12. The fee
incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys suggest a number of important implications. First, plaintiffs' law-
yers will seek out lawsuits that have a reasonably good chance of generating some sort of positive
award and that require a minimum of preliminary research by the attorney. Id. at 681-82. Empiri-
cal work on derivative and class actions confirms these hypotheses. Although the data is subject to
interpretation, shareholder suits typically "piggyback" on major publicly disclosed corporate events
such as bankruptcies, civil administrative investigations, criminal indictments, and takeover an-
nouncements. Id.; Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 20, at 376-78. Second, the incentive structure
suggests that most shareholder cases should settle. If the plaintiff's attorney can get a percentage of
the settlement, then he has every incentive to do very little work and take his fee on that basis. If the
fee is based on hours worked, the plaintiff's lawyer will bill the number of hours he feels the case can
sustain and then press for settlement to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment that will render all his
work for naught. Again, empirical research reveals that over 70% of shareholder cases settle. Jones,
supra note 21, at 545. Indeed, in a 1980 study, Professor Jones found that of 531 derivative and class
actions studied during the period from 1970 to 1978, only 15 cases were litigated to judgment and, of
these, the plaintiff prevailed in two and the defendants won 13. Id. at 544-45; Kennedy, Securities
Class and Derivative Actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An
Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. REv. 769, 811 (1977) (noting that 83% of cases under study settled).
144. During the 1940s, the New York State Chamber of Commerce commissioned a report re-
vealing that plaintiffs recovered in only 13 of 573 derivative suits filed between 1932 and 1942 involv-
ing public corporations. See F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE Sunrs 32 (1944); Coffee, supra note 10, at 698. This report led to the adoption of many
procedures to discourage the filing of frivolous derivative suits.
145. See, eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40(a); Har-
brecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REv.
1041 (1978).
146. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986); R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.5,
at 652.
147. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40(b); R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.2, at 640;
Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 746 (1960). A majority of jurisdictions technically require that plaintiffs make demand on
both the board and shareholders prior to bringing a derivative action. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1011 (6th ed. 1988). The more important corporate
law states such as Delaware, California, and New York, however, have eliminated the requirement
of a demand on shareholders and require demand on the board only. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 800(b)(2) (West 1987); DE. CH. CT. RULE 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1986).
148. See, ag., FED. R. CiV. P. 23.1; REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40(b); R.
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that a derivative action has been filed, the board may, in some jurisdictions,
appoint a "special litigation committee" composed of independent directors who
have no conflict of interest with respect to the subject matter of the complaint to
review the matter. 149 This committee may ask the court to dismiss the suit if,
after a good-faith investigation, it finds that the corporation would be best served
by dismissal.1 50
Protection is also provided to shareholders by judicial supervision of deriva-
tive suit settlements. Most statutes require that any settlement or dismissal be
approved by the court to prevent collusion between the corporation and the
plaintiff's attorney that might adversely affect other shareholders who have not
participated in the action.
1 51
Derivative suits have been strongly criticized in recent years.152 For exam-
ple, economists have studied the empirical effects of both the filing and termina-
tion of shareholder suits on the price of the subject company's shares. They
have found that the announcement of a suit moves stock price downward,
i5 3
while the termination of a suit, with or without a recovery for the corporation,
has no material effect on price. 154 In the legal arena, shareholder suit reforms
appear to be restricting rather than expanding the scope of these actions. For
example, the Supreme Court has forbidden use of the federal securities laws in
shareholder suits that are based on a managerial breach of fiduciary duty unless
some managerial fraud can be shown.15 5 In addition, the Court has discouraged
use of attorneys' fee award formulae that place emphasis on the riskiness of the
CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.2.1, at 641 ("demand is considered futile where the alleged wrongdoers
comprise or control a majority of the directors").
149. See, eg., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Connecticut law), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979); Note,
Director Independence and Derivative Suit Settlements, 1983 DUKE L.J. 645. But see Miller v. Regis-
ter and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) (rejecting use of special litigation
committee when committee was appointed by defendants in the derivative action).
150. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963 n.13 (survey finding no case in which the
Special Litigation Committee failed to recommend dismissal of action against incumbent directors);
Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894,
1905 (1983).
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; REvISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.40(c); R. CLARK, supra
note 19, § 15.7, at 657.
152. This criticism has been led by law and economics scholars who question the efficiency of the
derivative action as a monitoring device. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
153. Jaffe & Westerfield, supra note 17, at 16.
154. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 17, at 282-83.
155. Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The Court in Sante Fe indicated its disap-
proval of any use of rule lOb-5 in corporate cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 478.
Lower courts have subsequently permitted claims by minority shareholders alleging breaches of fidu-
ciary duty under rule lOb-5, however, when the breach of duty is accompanied by some misrepresen-
tation or omission. See, eg., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647
(3d Cir. 1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
The Court has also cut back on the remedies available to shareholders using the class action remedy
as a means to sue corporate managers by imposing standing limitations, see Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and by raising proof requirements, see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), in actions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See generally R.
CLARK, supra note 19, § 8.10, at 316-40 (discussingHochfelder, Blue Chip, and the effects since 1975
of a conservative Supreme Court on private actions under rule lOb-5).
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litigation, favoring instead a conservative "lodestar" approach that compensates
plaintiffs' lawyers calculated on the basis of hours actually billed on the case.15 6
Moreover, the advent of the special litigation committee as a means of dis-
missing derivative suits makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to get the merits of a
claim before a court.15 7 Finally, in response to a perceived "liability crisis" that
was threatening to empty the boardroom of outside directors, the majority of
states have recently passed special statutes exempting directors from personal
liability for most violations of the duty of care and have thus limited to some
degree the sources from which a damage award may be recovered. 158 These
trends appear to signal a widespread attitude among courts and legislatures that
shareholder litigation is in no need of further encouragement and may in fact
need to be curbed.
B. Arbitration of Public Shareholder Disputes: A New Legal Environment
The debate regarding shareholder litigation has only just begun to include
serious discussion of arbitration as an alternative remedy. 159 Indeed, until re-
cently scholars and practitioners alike simply assumed that arbitration of share-
holder suits was a legal impossibility. First, derivative actions often contain
allegations that the federal securities laws have been violated and, until 1987,
such claims were beyond the jurisdiction of arbitrators. 160 Second, prior to 1984
most state courts applied their own rules regarding the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, and all state laws approving the use of arbitration as a remedy
for corporate governance disputes were carefully limited to close corpora-
tions. 161 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court's decisions in Southland,
Perry, and McMahon have overturned the assumptions on which both of these
analyses proceeded. 162 In addition, the scholarly debate on the efficacy of deriv-
ative litigation has taken place within a set of implicit assumptions regarding the
necessity of a judicial forum for the resolution of shareholder disputes.
Although scholars disagree about the appropriate content of the duties of care
and loyalty, their commentary on these issues has been addressed, at least in
part, to courts.1 63 The driving force behind the derivative suit is the plaintiffs'
156. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
These Supreme Court cases were rendered in the context of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), but they "will likely impact class and derivative actions."
Coffee, supra note 10, at 675 n.15.
157. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
158. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1988); Gelb, Director Due Care
Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE L.Q. 13 (1988); Hanks, Recent State Legis-
lation on D&O Liability Limitation, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988); Hanks, Update on State Legislative
Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 21 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 23 (1988).
159. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Section 620(c) of New York's Business Cor-
poration Law, for example, expressly stipulates that no corporation that takes advantage of its more
liberal governance provisions may have shares that are "listed on a national securities exchange or
regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney
1986).
162. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
163. Only one student commentator, for example, has called for the abolition of the derivative
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lawyer, whose fee must be set by the court under existing rules. 16 4 Finally, the
statutes that govern derivative actions all mandate judicial approval of settle-
ments and dismissals.1 65 Given these background assumptions, it is no surprise
that arbitration of public shareholder claims has not received serious
consideration.
The Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the Federal Arbitraton Act, how-
ever, has significantly strengthened the legal arguments favoring arbitration. In
the subsections below, this Article traces the arguments and counterarguments
that would be raised in any attempt to enforce an arbitration provision in a
public corporation's charter. This exercise illustrates the interaction between
the new arbitration law principles and the old corporate law objections to arbi-
tration. It also highlights several questions that remain in the wake of the
Supreme Court's recent pro-arbitration decisions.
For purposes of this discussion, the Article assumes that a public corpora-
tion, either in its original charter or via a valid, duly approved amendment to its
articles of incorporation, has included in its charter 16 6 a provision that requires
all shareholders of the corporation to use arbitration in suits brought by share-
holders against or on behalf of the corporation. The stock certificates issued by
the corporation reference the charter in general terms and incorporate its provi-
sions fully.
1. What Arbitration Law Applies?
The first issue confronting a court asked to enforce such a provision would
action. See Comment, supra note 11, at 902-05. Law and economics scholars, meanwhile, feel the
derivative suit is overemphasized but recognize that it "definitely answers a special need." Manne,
supra note 75, at 273.
164. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. One might argue that an arbitration provision placed in the corporation's bylaws, rather
than the charter, should be enforceable. Management might prefer a bylaw provision because a
shareholder vote is generally not required to amend the bylaws, whereas such a vote is required to
amend the charter. See, eg., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT §§ 10.03(b)(2) (charter), 10.20
(1984) (bylaws). Moreover, the bylaws of a corporation are sometimes said to give rise to contrac-
tual rights between the shareholders and the corporation. See, eg., Norris v. South Shore Chamber
of Commerce, 98 Il. App. 3d 32, 424 N.E.2d 76, 77 (1981); Swanson v. Shockley, 364 N.W.2d 252,
255 (Iowa 1985); Toler v. Clark Rural Elec. Coop., 512 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. 1974); Golden v. Oahe
Enter., 240 N.W.2d 102, 108 (S.D. 1976); Field, Resolving Shareholder Disputes and Breaking Dead-
locks in the Close Corporation, 58 MINN. L. REv. 985, 1001 (1974). As a matter of corporate law,
however, the bylaws are subordinate to the charter and would have correspondingly less contractual
force under the FAA. 1 E. FOLK, R. WARD & E. WELCH, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 109.7.1 (2d ed. 1988). In addition, most corporate statutes provide explicitly
that substantial variations from the conventional model of corporate governance be included in the
charter, and bylaw provisions are not an adequate substitute under these laws. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). Cf Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985)
(invalidating attempt to alter statutory "consent" procedure by imposing stipulations in bylaws and
stating that such alterations in statutory "consent" rights must be contained in charter). Thus, a
governance provision such as an arbitration clause, which substantially affects the statutory rights of
shareholders to bring derivative actions, would have to be placed in the charter to satisfy the require-
ments of corporate law. Once a corporation had such a charter provision, however, the shareholders
might have an interest in seeing that the bylaws contain an analogous section in order to strengthen
their argument that the directors and officers were as bound as they to the arbitration agreement.
See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
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be: what arbitration law governs? 167 It seems clear that the FAA, as opposed to
state arbitration law, would be the source of governing norms for questions of
arbitrability. The shares of public corporations are sold in interstate commerce;
such entities conduct the great majority of their business in interstate and for-
eign commerce, and the disputes that give rise to most shareholder claims in-
volve the use of interstate communication systems. Factors such as these have
led courts to apply the FAA in a variety of commercial contexts16s and would
doubtless lead to the choice of the FAA as governing law for public corporation
arbitration.
The fact that federal arbitration law applies is crucial to any legal case seek-
ing enforcement of a corporate charter arbitration provision. As demonstrated
in the context of the close corporation, a host of state public policy concerns
have been and could be raised to defeat arbitration if enforcement is sought
solely on the basis of state arbitration law.1
69
2. Is the Corporate Charter a "Contract" Under the FAA?
The first and most vexing substantive question to arise under the FAA
would be whether a charter provision mandating arbitration constitutes a "writ-
ten provision in [a] ... contract" pursuant to section 2.170 The arbitration pro-
vision would be in writing, so the question would be whether the corporate
charter, as incorporated by reference in the shareholder's stock certificate, is a
"contract" under the FAA.
There is no general federal common law of contract, and the FAA therefore
looks to state law to determine whether section 2 has been satisfied.1 7 1 As a
matter of state corporate law, courts have traditionally viewed the corporate
charter as a three-way contract between the corporation and the state, between
the shareholders and the corporation, and among the shareholders inter se.172 It
167. The question of whether state or federal arbitration law applies to the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement is distinct, of course, from the question of whether state or federal substantive
law forms the basis of the shareholders' claim. The applicable arbitration statute addresses the issues
of whether the arbitration clause should be enforced and whether the award should be confirmed.
See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. The underlying claim forms the basis for a damage
award by an arbitration panel.
168. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
170. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) ("A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .. "). It appears that the drafters of the
FAA were considering primarily conventional commercial contracts when they wrote § 2. See, eg.,
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.P 646 before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., 38 (1924) (statement of Mr.
Cohen, American Bar Association) ("An agreement for arbitration is in its essence a business con-
tract. It differs in no essential from other commercial agreements.").
171. Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9 (1987) ("state law, whether of legislative or
judicial origin, is applicable ifthat law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally"). If state law devises a special contract rule to govern
arbitration agreements, however, then the federal policy inherent in the FAA may preempt such a
rule if it is hostile to arbitration. Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
172. The corporate charter little resembles the usual commercial agreement for the sale of goods
or services. Nevertheless, commentators, courts, and legislatures have relied extensively on contract
terminology to describe the charter and its legal effects. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 118, at
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could be argued that this corporate doctrine satisfies the FAA's threshold re-
quirement of a contract and provides an easy answer to section 2.173
Even in the context of close corporation arbitration, however, scholars have
been reluctant to rely exclusively on the charter as a sufficient basis for enforcing
an agreement to arbitrate. Rather, small business advisors have suggested that
the arbitration clause be included in both the charter and the shareholder agree-
ment.174 Moreover, in the context of public corporations, any close analysis of
the "charter as contract" question quickly reveals a number of troublesome is-
sues that lie just below the surface of the doctrine. 175 Indeed, the issue of
whether the charter is a literal contract raises fundamental questions about the
very nature of the corporation.
To some law and economics scholars, the corporation has no identity apart
from the contracts that link its various stakeholders, including shareholders, to
one another.1 76 As the hub of the relationships between the shareholders and
129-30 ("each corporate 'charter' was [viewed by the law as] the product of a threefold negotiation
involving the state and the combined associates, and between the groups of associates acting for
themselves. [The charter] was recognized as a 'contract' and has been consistently so dealt with in
American law"). See Wylain v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 1979) ("the corporate
charter, 1) is a contract between the state and the corporation... ; 2) is a contract between the
corporation and its stockholders... ; and 3) is a contract between the stockholders inter se .... ").
A number of state corporation statutes codify this notion by expressly referring to the charter as a
"contract." See, eg., MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE § 2-602(a)(3) (1985) (granting appraisal right to
shareholders if an amendment to the charter "alters the contract rights, as expressly set forth in the
charter, of any outstanding stock, and the charter does not reserve the right to make the amend-
ment"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-174 (1982) (reserving power of the state to amend or repeal the
charter of any corporation and stating that the corporation statute "is a part of the charter contract
between the shareholders"). In England, the Companies Act expressly provides that the articles of a
corporation are to be construed as a contract between each of the shareholders and the company,
Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 14.
173. Coffee, supra note 12, at 964 (stating that "corporate law clearly considers the corporate
charter to be a contract" but "divergent answers are possible" on the issue of whether the charter
would be construed as a binding agreement to arbitrate by shareholders based on "implied-in-fact"
acceptance by the shareholder).
174. See, eg., R. KESSLER, supra note 64, at 19; F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 64, at
812.
175. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 118, at 129-30 (the notion that the charter is a contract
"does not bear analysis"). The "contract" between the corporation and the state, for example, is of
dubious validity. In the early nineteenth century, courts treated the issuance of a corporate charter
by the state as a contractual act, but modem corporation statutes have left this concept behind. See
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 592 (1819); Butler, General
Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes,
6 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 169 (1986). In Dartmouth College the Court held that the state of New
Hampshire violated the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution by attempting to revoke a royal
charter granted to Dartmouth College before the American Revolution. Justice Story opined that
the Constitution would not be offended by changes in state corporation law if the state conditioned
the granting of its charters with a reserved power to alter or amend the corporate statute.
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675, 712 (Story, J., concurring). This lawyerly advice led
to enactment of "reserve power" clauses in all state corporation statutes under which states reserved
the right to alter, amend, or repeal provisions of their corporate codes without constitutional limita-
tion. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 91, § 340, at 952-53. More importantly, as a matter of
policy, the state does not "contract" with the corporation when it grants a charter any more than it
"contracts" with buyers of goods by enacting warranty laws.
176. Butler & Ribstein, In Defense of Private Ordering in the Corporation 1 n.1 (1988) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author) ("The corporation may, indeed, be viewed as a bundle of




between the shareholders and the corporation, the charter qualifies as a literal
"contract" with as much force as any other commercial agreement. 177 State law
is simply one aspect of this contract-an aspect that may be easily changed by
shareholders through the process of reincorporating in a state with rules that
suit their purposes.
178
If an individual shareholder gives scant thought to the charter as a contrac-
tual document, this inattention takes nothing away from the charter's contrac-
tual status. Consumers pay no more attention to many sales agreements, and
public investors in corporate bonds are no more aware of the complex terms of
bond indentures. 179 Moreover, the bundle of rights assembled in the charter of a
public corporation have been efficiently priced by the stock market. The share-
holder essentially "gets what he pays for" without having to search the charter
for the terms of the purchase.180 Certainly, if one accepts the economists' view
of the charter as a literal contract, section 2 is not a problem. The arbitration
provision, as part of the charter, has been "priced" by the market, and the share-
holder has "accepted" the provision simply by agreeing to pay the market price
for the shares.
When courts speak of the charter as a contract,18 1 however, they do so
within a frame of reference restricted to corporate law. Charter provisions such
as shareholder preferences, voting rights, and antitakeover mechanisms deline-
ate aspects of the bundle of property interests that make up shareholders' eco-
nomic stake in the corporation, but such provisions owe their existence to state
corporate law and are not subject to common-law contract principles. For ex-
ample, in a conventional contract, one party does not have the right unilaterally
to alter the terms of the agreement to suit itself without either paying additional
consideration or being in breach. 182 Corporation statutes, by contrast, permit
177. Professors Butler and Ribstein have gone so far as to argue that, despite the reserved power
of the state to alter corporate law, states should be constitutionally prohibited from interfering with
the charter through amendments to the law governing shareholder relationships. See Butler & Rib-
stein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 611 (1988).
178. Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J. L. & ECON.
179, 179 (1985).
179. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 176, at 15-19.
180. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 176, at 46-49. This analysis depends heavily on acceptance of
some version of the "efficient market hypothesis" of finance theory. See Jensen, Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EON. 95, 96-97 (1978); Jensen, Random Walks in
Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. No. 5, 55, 56 (Sept.-Oct. 1965). This hypothesis has been
criticized in a number of recent articles. Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of
"Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 898-900 (1988).
181. Eg., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 313-14, 93 A.2d 107, 118 (1952)
("the stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract embody in the charter a provision
departing from the rules of the common law, provided that it does not transgress a statutory enact-
ment or a public policy").
182. Such a modification would lack consideration. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.21, at
271 (1982). In an earlier era, shareholders were said to have "vested rights" in certain characteris-
tics of their shares and such rights could not be altered without the express consent of each share-
holder. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 91, at 953-55. Thus, the corporation could not
extinguish or alter dividend rights, liquidation preferences, or voting rights without unanimous con-
sent of the shareholders. Coffee, supra note 12, at 962 & n.90 (citing cases). This vested rights
doctrine is now obsolete. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 10.01(b) (1984) ("A shareholder
of the corporation does not have a vested property right resulting from any provision in the articles
of incorporation .... ").
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
liberal, unilateral alteration of many shareholder rights by management 8 3 or by
majority vote of the shareholders without giving dissenting shareholders a right
to relief for breach of contract.
1 4
Traditional corporate law scholars are also reluctant to speak of the public
corporation's charter as a literal contract for reasons of policy. 185 These schol-
ars are more skeptical than economists about the efficiency of the stock market
and insist more rigorously on evidence of explicit consent by shareholders to
major changes in corporate governance before giving documents such as the
charter contractual force. 186 Thus, courts considering whether a charter arbi-
tration provision satisfies section 2 may need to look beyond corporate law for
an answer.
Even if the courts reject the idea of the charter as a literal contract, arbitra-
tion law supports the recognition of documents like the charter, which do not fit
the model of conventional commerical agreeements, as having contractual force.
Charters operate as organizational constitutions that bind their members to gen-
eral sets of rights and duties, and the common law recognizes such constitutions
as contracts. 187 Therefore, courts have frequently upheld arbitration provisions
contained in bylaws or constitutions of private associations, 188 even when the
member has not signed a separate agreement to be bound by the rules of the
association.189 The constitutions or bylaws of labor organizations, 190 religious
groups,19 1 realty boards, 192 and securities exchanges 193 have all been held to
183. Management may affect shareholder interests unilaterally through amendments to bylaws
or by taking action permitted by statutory rule. See, eg., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aar
§ 10.20 (1984) (amendment of bylaws), § 11.04 (merger of subsidiary into parent corporation when
parent corporation owns at least 90% of subsidiary's stock).
184. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 10.2.4.
185. Brudney, supra note 116, at 1412 (concept of a "contract" stretched "beyond recognition"
if used to describe relations between public shareholders and management).
186. Brudney, supra note 116, at 1423-24; Cox, supra note 9, at 74748.
187. See, eg., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 683 (1871); Rachford v. Indemnity Ins.
Co., 183 F. Supp. 875, 879 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Local Union, U.M.W. v. Cikra, 86 Ohio App. 41, 90
N.E.2d 154 (1949); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 8, at 435 (1963) ("The constitution,
rules, and bylaws of an unincorporated association... constitute a contract between the members
which the courts will enforce.").
188. Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 453 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("A party who agrees
to abide by the rules of an organization [the New York Stock Exchange] is bound by its subsequently
adopted rule calling for arbitration."); M. DOMKE, supra note 23, § 7.02, at 87-88.
189. Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (whether a member
of a securities exchange signs the exchange constitution or not, "every member, by virtue of his
admission, contracts to be governed by the conditions of membership which the exchange has
imposed").
190. Willard Alexander, Inc. v. Glaser, 31 N.Y.2d 270, 273, 290 N.E.2d 813, 338 N.Y.S.2d 609,
611 (1972) (orchestra leader who was member of American Federation of Musicians bound by arbi-
tration provision in union constitution and bylaws because "when a person becomes a member of a
labor organization, or any other association, he thereby agrees, as a matter of law, to abide by the
duly enacted provisions of its constitution and bylaws unless they are contrary to good morals or
public policy or otherwise illegal"), cert denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973).
191. Matter of Koppel, 52 A.D.2d 676, 382 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1976). In Koppel members of a
religious congregation bought bonds from the organization to raise funds for the acquisition of a
building. At the time most of the bonds were issued the congregation had adopted a governing
structure consisting of all those who owned at least one bond. The rules of the governing body called
for resolution of all disputes between bondholders by a panel of arbitrators consisting of the presi-
dent, vice-president, and treasurer of the organization, with a right of appeal to the entire governing
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bind members to arbitration provisions contained within these governing
documents. 194
Assuming the "charter as constitution" argument brings the charter into
the realm of enforceable documents, under section 2, there remains the question
whether public shareholders have "accepted" a charter arbitration clause by
purchasing shares in the corporation. In most membership organizations, mem-
bers share important professional, personal, or religious interests. Consent to
arbitration can therefore be implied from the member's general willingness to be
subject to the prevailing professional or organizational norms. In the public cor-
poration, literally millions of shareholders share no common ground other than
their investment preference.
Therefore, consent to arbitration must be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the shareholder's decision to become and remain an investor in the
particular public corporation.19 5 In practical terms, the issue of acceptance
comes down to a question of effective notice to shareholders that they are buying
shares in a company that has opted for arbitration. For example, the fact that
the corporate arbitration provision is not spelled out on the stock certificate but
is incorporated by reference may give a shareholder grounds to argue that sec-
tion 2 has not been satisfied. Courts have refused to order arbitration when the
only contractual basis for arbitrating was an obscure reference in the agreement
to "rules" of an association or to the terms of another contract. 196 Shareholders
should not be bound by arbitration provisions unless their stock certificates ref-
erence the charter arbitration clause in specific terms.
197
body. The bonds themselves, however, did not refer to these bylaws and made no mention of arbi-
tration. On these facts, the court enforced the arbitration provision.
192. King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 349, 357, 175 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (1981);
Bastone v. Dial-A-House, Inc., 100 Misc. 2d 1026, 1027, 420 N.Y.S.2d 467, 467 (1979); Keith Ad-
ams & Assoc. v. Edwards, 3 Wash. App. 623, 477 P.2d 36 (1970).
193. Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2523 (1987) (noting that arbitration agreement was in-
corporated by reference in stockbroker's employment agreement); Fox v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F.
Supp. 766, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
194. California State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 541, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89
(1975) ("the relationship between the members [of the Association] and the group is determined by
contract, the terms of which find expression in the constitution and by-laws"). But see Westlake
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 98-99, 551 P.2d 410, 418-19 (1976) (refus-
ing to enforce hospital bylaws that precluded access to court for physicians claiming wrongful termi-
nation of privileges).
195. As the Supreme Court stated in a recent commercial arbitration opinion, "Arbitration
under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, no coercion .... ." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1989).
196. See, eg., Western Vegetable Oils Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 141 F.2d 235, 236-37 (9th
Cir. 1944); Windowmaster Corp. v. B.G. Danis Co., 511 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Pills-
bury v. Blumenthal, 58 N.M. 422, 426, 272 P.2d 326, 328-29 (1954); Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v.
Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 291-92, 118 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1954); Matter of General Silk
Importing Co., 200 A.D. 786, 791-93, 194 N.Y.S. 15, 19-21, aff'd, 234 N.Y. 513, 138 N.E. 427
(1922); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 49 Misc. 2d 512, 513-14, 267 N.Y.S.2d
669, 671 (Sup. Ct. 1966); American Rail & Steel Co. v. India Supply Mission, 308 N.Y. 577, 579-80,
127 N.E.2d 562, 562-63 (1955).
197. The weight of modem authority on the question of incorporating arbitration agreements by
reference favors enforcement of the referenced arbitration clause. See, e.g., Exchange Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Haskell, 742 F.2d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1984); J & S Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 520
F.2d 809, 810 (1st Cir. 1975); Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 243
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Even if stock certificates are embossed with the words "subject to arbitra-
tion," there may still be a problem of actual notice to shareholders. Sharehold-
ers do not sign any document signaling their acceptance of the charter, and most
investors hold their shares through nominees and thus would never see the stock
certificates that might explicitly discuss the arbitration provision.198 Finally,
whatever information the stockholder does receive is received after the purchase
of the stock is complete.
The notice problem makes it difficult to predict whether the courts would
find that public shareholders "accepted" arbitration when they purchased shares
in the corporation. Corporations could allay this concern by taking affirmative
steps to bring the arbitration provision to the attention of shareholders in mean-
ingful ways. At a minimum, the arbitration clause should appear prominently
on share certificates. In addition, the corporation should inform shareholders of
the provision in annual reports, SEC filings and like communications, and by
periodically notifying the professional investment community of this feature of
the charter. Because shareholders are free to sell their shares and invest in other
ventures if they strongly disagree with the arbitration provision, such notifica-
tion would go a long way toward addressing the policy concerns implicit in sec-
tion 2 and would give both the "charter as contract" and "charter as
constitution" arguments a basis in traditional contract and arbitration law.
3. Would Enforcement of an Arbitration Provision Be Unconscionable?
Section 2 of the FAA exempts from enforcement arbitration agreements
that are revocable under common-law contract principles. 199 This exemption
includes arbitration clauses that are induced by fraud2°° and those that are "un-
conscionable." 201 If management misrepresented the impact of arbitration in its
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App.3d 899, 904
n.3, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 n.3 (1977). Better Bldg. Materials Co. v. Kirschner, 142 Conn. 1, 6-7, 110
A.2d 464, 468 (1954); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Contractors, 48 N.Y.2d 127,
132-33, 397 N.E.2d 380, 381, 421 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (1979). The older cases refusing to enforce
incorporated arbitration agreements construed such contracts strictly, in part, as a means of guard-
ing the courts' jurisdiction. Wilson v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364, 368-69 (D. Neb.
1948) (reviewing and criticizing older New York cases). When dealing with a novel use of arbitra-
tion such as this Article discusses, however, strict construction of the notice requirement of contract
law seems appropriate.
198. R. HAMILTON, supra note 76, at 540-42 (quoting Final Report of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on the Practice of Recording the Ownership of Securities in the Records of the
Issuer on Other Than the Name of the Beneficial Owner of Such Securities (1976)).
199. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (agreements to arbitrate are valid and enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
200. The fraud claim must go specifically to the arbitration clause itself. Claims that the con-
tract as a whole was induced by fraud are not grounds for refusing enforcement of an arbitration
clause. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
201. Unconscionability is a general defense to contract enforcement based on the unfairness and
oppression that would result if a contract provision is given effect. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John
Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("[u]nconscionability is the rubric under which the
judiciary may refuse to enforce unfair or oppressive contracts in the absence of fraud or illegality"),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 208 (1981); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931
(1969). This concern with "fairness" has two dimensions: the fairness of the bargaining relationship
between the parties at the time the contract was made and the fairness of enforcing a particular
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proxy materials for obtaining shareholder approval of an arbitration clause, for
example, it might be argued that the provision is unenforceable because consent
to it was fraudulently induced.
20 2
The question of unconscionability would also raise a substantial issue in an
action seeking enforcement of a public corporation's charter arbitration provi-
sion. Even assuming the corporation institutes the notification procedures sug-
gested above, the passive nature of public shareholder ownership assures that
many shareholders will be unaware of a charter arbitration provision and, even
if aware of it, will have accepted arbitration without meaningful bargaining.
These shareholders may argue that the charter of a public corporation is a "con-
tract of adhesion" 20 3 and should not be enforced.
There can be little doubt that, if the charter is a contract at all, it is adhesive
in character. Public shareholders have no meaningful choice when presented
with the option of buying the corporation's stock: either they buy the stock with
the existing charter or they do not buy the stock at all. The corporation does not
bargain over the content of the charter except in highly unusual
circumstances.
2 o4
In addition, the use of arbitration in the context of public shareholder dis-
putes is unprecedented. Arbitration may therefore be characterized as an unfair
surprise to the shareholder who wakes up to find that her right to bring a deriva-
tive action in court has been spirited away through the magic of a charter
amendment.
20 5
Finally, the corporation has vastly superior bargaining power with respect
to charter amendments as compared to most individual shareholders.20 6 Such a
contract term at the time the agreement is to be implemented. These two aspects of unconscionabil-
ity have been labeled "procedural" unconscionability and "substantive" unconscionability. See Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 485, 487 (1967).
202. Such misrepresentations by management would also be grounds for legal actions under the
federal securities laws. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (recognizing an
implied cause of action on behalf of shareholders for violations of federal proxy rules).
203. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1177
(1983) (listing a number of characteristics of adhesion contracts including the use of standard forms
drafted by one side in a transaction that anticipates using the form with many parties, and the
acceptance by the other side without bargaining or substantial alteration). Because the shareholder
does not sign the charter, however, it does not resemble so much the classic adhesive contract stud-
ied by Professor Rakoff as certain unsigned "documents" such as warranties that are simply
presented to the adhering party. Id. at 1179 & n.12. See Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63
HARV. L. REv. 494 (1950) (collecting cases).
204. Charter amendments may form part of the negotiations between companies and sharehold-
ers in a merger, takeover, or bankruptcy, e.g., Sullivan & Petzinger, Ichan Seeks to File His Own
Proposal To Revamp Texaco, Wall. St. J., Jan. 6, 1988, at 3, col. 3 (Carl Ichan, Texaco's largest
shareholder, seeking to remove antitakeover charter provisions to facilitate takeover), but corpora-
tions do not negotiate such amendments with everyday shareholders and successfully resist most
shareholder proposals presented at annual meetings. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder
Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425, 425-26 (1984) (stating that, according to the SEC, only two
shareholder proposals not supported by management had been approved by shareholders prior to
1984 under SEC rule 14a-8).
205. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (1978) ("the principle [of unconscionability] is one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise").
206. Superior bargaining strength is often cited as a factor in unconscionability analysis. Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-91, 161 A.2d 69, 86-87 (1960); Kessler, Con-
tracts ofAdhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943);
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great disparity in bargaining strength, combined with the adhesive nature of the
agreement and its surprising consequences, add up to a strong case for refusing
to enforce an arbitration clause under the "revocation" exception contained in
section 2. As strong as this argument is, the unconscionability issue is not likely
to block enforcement of public corporation arbitration. The courts have been
singularly unreceptive to claims by investors that arbitration clauses in standard
form adhesive contracts are unconscionable. In the wake of the McMahon deci-
sion, securities customers have repeatedly sought judicial relief from arbitration
clauses contained in standard broker-customer agreements based on uncon-
scioinability principles but have failed in virtually every case. 20 7 The unstated
premise behind such claims, after all, is that there is something unfair or inferior
about arbitration as a means of resolving commercial disputes. The Supreme
Court has stated in the strongest possible terms that it believes this premise to be
false. 208 If courts routinely force shareholders to abide by unnoticed arbitration
clauses contained in boilerplate on the back of margin agreements, there seems
little reason to believe that a different result will obtain just because the arbitra-
tion clause appears in a corporate charter.
In addition, disparities in bargaining power are not favored as grounds for
refusing to enforce contracts, 20 9 and shareholders do not present the most sym-
pathetic case for an exception to this rule. Unconscionability is most often
found in the consumer context and operates to relieve unwary, disadvantaged
consumers from onerous contract terms imposed by more powerful business par-
ties.2 10 People who have sufficient funds and sophistication to invest in the eq-
uity securities of individual corporations do not fit this mold comfortably and
may, in many cases, be quite wealthy. Thus, although such investors may not
have bargaining power equal to their corporations', they are probably sophisti-
cated enough to bear the risk of being bound by otherwise legal provisions in a
corporate charter.
Finally, a ruling that a corporate charter arbitration clause is unenforceable
as an adhesive provision would set an alarming precedent in the area of corpo-
rate governance. An arbitration provision will not be in place unless it was con-
tained in the original charter or adopted as a charter amendment by a vote of the
shareholders. The clause will thus have the same status as every other provision
in the charter. Although shareholders may not see or inquire about an arbitra-
tion provision in the corporation's charter prior or subsequent to purchasing
their shares, they are likely to be equally ignorant of every other provision in the
charter. Unless a court is willing to strike down an arbitration clause on the
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 479 & n.23 (1980). But see
U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 ("The principle [of unconscionability] is... not of disturbance of alloca-
tion of risks because of superior bargaining power.").
207. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988); Rush V.
Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Shell, supra note 2, at 427-30.
208. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
209. See U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978); supra note 206.
210. See Note, Commercial Decency and the Code: The Doctrine of Unconscionability Vindi-
cated, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1144-45 (1968).
[Vol. 67
CORPORATE ARBITRATION
broad ground that all charter provisions are "adhesive" and subject to claims by
shareholders for special exemptions, no part of the charter should be subject to
challenge on this basis. The Supreme Court has made clear that "special" rules
discriminating against arbitration clauses are preempted by the FAA.
2 11
4. What Parties Would Be Bound By or Could Seek to Enforce an
Arbitration Provision?
Assuming a charter arbitration provision would be subject to enforcement
under the FAA, who among corporate stakeholders would be entitled to enforce
the provision against whom? It would appear that arbitration charter provisions
could be drafted to bind both the corporation and its shareholders in disputes
among themselves. Such a provision would simply declare that all disputes be-
tween shareholders and the corporation or among the shareholders inter se re-
garding corporate activities are to be arbitrated. 2 12 For such a provision to
encompass derivative actions, the clause would have to be expanded to include
suits brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation.
Surprisingly, directors and officers who are likely to be defendants in some
derivative actions have available to them a technical argument that they should
not be bound by the arbitration provision. Directors and officers are, respec-
tively, trustees and agents of the corporation and are sued as such for breaches
of fiduciary duty.213 Whatever the contractual status of the charter, it has not
been traditionally viewed as a contract between the-shareholders and the corpo-
ration's management elite.2 14 Therefore, a director might argue that he should
not be bound by the charter to arbitrate any more than a third party, such as a
supplier, would be bound on a contract or tort claim brought against it by the
corporation. 215
211. Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9 (1987); supra note 49 and accompanying text.
212. Such a provision would clearly mandate that direct actions by shareholders against the
corporation and actions by the corporation against its shareholders be arbitrated. Direct actions by
shareholders are frequently brought in the form of class actions and would call for special arbitral
procedures that are beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the arbitration of derivative
claims. There is precedent for the arbitration of class actions, however. See infra notes 268-69 and
accompanying text.
213. Officers are in a classic agency relationship with the corporation, while directors have a
"special" agency status similar to that of a trustee. Loft v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2 A.2d 225,
238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 14C comment a (1958) (board of directors closely resembles both agent and non-agent
trustee but qualifies for neither status under strict application of agency law); R. CLARK, supra note
19, § 3.3, at 114. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) ("Officers and directors shall be deemed in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders ... .
214. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
215. In the leading English case involving the arbitration of intracorporate disputes, the court
refused to permit a director to invoke a charter provision calling for arbitration when he was named
as a defendant in a derivative suit. Beattie v. E. & F. Beattie, Ltd., 1 Ch. 708, 719-20 (C.A. 1938).
English law is explicit about the contractual nature of the articles of incorporation. Section 14 of
Company Act 1985 provides that "the... articles shall, when registered, bind the company and the
members thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed and sealed by each
member, and contained covenants on the part of each member to observe all the provisions of the...
articles." Company Act, 1985, ch. 6, § 14. Whether this statutory provision can be relied on to
form the basis of a contract right when the articles stipulate for the employment of particular indi-
viduals has been the subject of lively debate among English academics. See Goldberg, The Contro-
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This argument is unpersuasive. Directors and officers are much more inti-
mately associated with the corporation than outside suppliers, other contracting
parties, or even lower-level employees of the corporation. As the individuals
who govern the corporation, they should be bound by any dispute resolution
system provided for in the charter just as they must honor any charter rules
determining the number of seats on the board, voting requirements for removal
of directors, or other basic governance matters.
The binding nature of the corporation's basic documents on officers and
directors is well settled, although most of the law in this area has concerned the
corporate bylaws rather than the charter.2 16 Indeed, as a precautionary mea-
sure, drafters of corporate arbitration clauses may wish to include reference to
the duty of officers and directors to arbitrate shareholder derivative claims in the
bylaws as well as the charter. In this way, the duty to arbitrate will be brought
home to those who may find themselves defendants in such actions.
Another means of eliminating any dispute regarding the duty of directors
and officers to arbitrate would be through the use of signed employment agree-
ments between them and the corporation calling for arbitration or referencing
the duty to arbitrate set forth in the charter and bylaws.2 17 With an explicit
contract in hand, the shareholders suing on behalf of the corporation would
have the strongest possible grounds for insisting on arbitration.2 18
versy on the Section 20 Contract Revisited, 48 MOD. L. REv. 158 (1985). Yet, the English court held
that the director could not enforce an arbitration clause since the director is, in essence, an employee
of the company and the articles do not constitute a contract between the company and parties serv-
ing as employees or agents. This was held to be the case even though the director was also a share-
holder, because the director was being sued in his capacity as an agent of the company, not in his
capacity as a shareholder. Beattie, 1 Ch. at 714.
216. See, eg., Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226 So. 2d
887, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ("The corporation and its directors and officers are bound by and
must comply with the charter and bylaws."); Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 497, 14 N.W.2d 913,
921 (1944) ("By-laws have the same force and effect as provisions of the charter or articles of incor-
poration and must be obeyed by the corporation, its directors, officers, and stockholders."); Golden
v. Oahe Enter., 90 S.D. 263, 274, 240 N.W.2d 102, 108 (1976) ("In addition to the corporation and
its stockholders, the bylaws are binding upon the directors .... "); 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4197, at 751 (Rev. perm. ed. 1966).
217. A number of public corporations have arbitration clauses in contracts with senior execu-
tives that have resulted in reported litigation. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The presence
of such agreements raises an intriguing possibility. An executive who has an arbitration clause in his
contract with the corporation, and who has been named a defendant in a derivative action, might be
able to seek enforcement of the arbitration clause and divert the derivative action into the arbitral
forum without reference to a charter provision. The corporation, after all, is a nominal party in the
derivative action, see 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 216, § 5997, and it is the corporation to which
officers and directors owe their fiduciary duties and to which recoveries in the derivative action must
go, Sternberg v. O'Neil, 532 A.2d 993, 998-99 (Del. Ch. 1987). It could be argued that the corpora-
tion and those suing on its behalf should be bound under an employment agreement to arbitrate all
disputes with the executive regarding his performance, including breaches of fiduciary duty. One
problem with this theory is that the corporation is a nominal defendant in a derivative action and
thus is a co-party with the officers and directors rather than an opposing party. See infra note 220.
Nevertheless, the cause of action asserted in a derivative suit belongs to the corporation, and it
would seem that contractual agreements limiting access to the courts to resolve disputes with man-
agers would bind shareholders suing on the corporation's behalf no less than the corporation itself,
218. See, e.g., Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co., 298 Md. 66, 79, 467 A.2d 1025, 1032 (1983)
(upholding arbitration of breach of loyalty claims by business firm against former officer and director
based on employment agreement); Magnus v. Magnus Organ Corp., 71 N.J. Super. 363, 368-69, 177
A.2d 55, 58 (1962) (upholding arbitration agreement between corporation and chief executive of-
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By the same token, directors, officers, and the corporation itself would have
standing to demand that plaintiff shareholders abide by the charter arbitration
agreement. 2 19 Since the corporation is joined in a derivative action as a nominal
defendant,220 it could easily move to compel arbitration of any derivative claim
brought improperly by shareholders.
22 1
5. Would Arbitration of Public Shareholder Disputes
Violate "Public Policy"?
The final legal question that might be raised in a challenge to enforcement
of an arbitration agreement in a corporate charter is the most intriguing: would
such a provision violate public policy? The arguments under this broad heading
would spring from both state and federal sources.
As a matter of state corporation law, the arbitration of shareholder claims
poses a threat to public policy for several reasons, some of which were reviewed
previously in the materials on close corporations. First, arbitration might "ster-
ilize the board" by removing from board discretion certain matters of business
policy that the statutory model reserves to the board of directors.222 Corporate
statutory provisions expressly permitting unlimited invasion of board discretion,
including arbitration of governance disputes, are restricted to close corporations
and do not apply if the shares of the corporation are listed on any securities
exchange or quoted on the over-the-counter market.223 This legislative distinc-
tion signals a strong preference for strict maintenance of the traditional model of
board governance for public corporations.
Procedurally, arbitration appears to sidestep the entire array of statutory
protections involving contemporaneous ownership, security bonds, demand re-
quirements, and court-approved settlements.224 Because arbitration lacks
mandatory discovery, rules of evidence, and other formalities of court litiga-
ficer); Faberge Int'l, Inc. v. Di Pino, 109 A.D.2d 235, 239, 491 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (1985) (staying
litigation pending arbitration of claims between corporation and executive vice president); cf White
v. White, 81 A.D.2d 550, 550-51, 438 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1981) (former corporate officer was not
obliged to arbitrate a dispute with his corporation's majority shareholder because his contractual
arbitration agreement was with the corporation, not the shareholder).
219. Even if the corporation was unwilling to enforce the arbitration agreement, officers and
directors might have standing to insist that the agreement be honored. First, their status as corpo-
rate stakeholders makes them parties to the agreement with equal standing to enforce its provisions.
Second, even as third parties, they are beneficiaries of the arbitration contract and may have benefi-
cial standing to assert their rights. See Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730
(Del. 1988) (third party may invoke demand requirement in derivative suit and insist that corpora-
tion either endorse or reject claim against third party).
220. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15.1, at 639-40 ("Although each derivative suit is now very
definitely treated in the courts as a single case, the historical conception survives in the customs of
making the corporation a nominal defendant in the action and allowing it to raise various objections
to the suit.").
221. Such claims would not be limited to actions against officers and directors for breach of
fiduciary duty but would extend to derivative actions seeking to assert the corporation's rights
against any third party. See supra note 137.
222. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney 1986).
224. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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tion,225 it may also be seen as inadequate to process complex derivative suits
touching the rights of many parties not in the hearing room.
Even as a matter of state law, such arguments are subject to debate. Given
the fact that a corporate arbitration provision would be placed in the charter,
corporate statutes themselves suggest that arbitration would not sterilize the
board. Most corporate statutes qualify the mandatory nature of board govern-
ance with open-ended language permitting all corporations to use modified gov-
ernance structures so long as the structure is spelled out explicitly in the articles
of incorporation. 226 Legislatures would not leave the matter of governance open
if they did not anticipate variations on the traditional model such as
arbitration.
2 27
Most of the procedural protections included in derivative suit statutes were
placed there to prevent frivolous suits228 and should be waivable by the corpora-
tion. More importantly, arbitrators would be free to impose the traditional de-
mand and contemporaneous ownership requirements of state law as part of the
accepted framework for resolving corporate disputes, and they would very likely
do so.229 With respect to court approval of settlements and the possibility of
collusion in its absence, state rules regarding the res judicata and collateral es-
toppel effects of arbitration can be manipulated by courts to prevent injustice.230
225. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text.
226. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) (corporation to be managed by directors,
"except as otherwise provided ... in its certificate of incorporation"). For example, Delaware's
statute explicitly permits corporations to include in their charters "any provision for the manage-
ment of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation; if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State." Id. § 102(b)(1); see Providence and Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378
A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 1977) (charter provision restricting voting is not prohibited by statute and is
therefore permitted by § 102(b)(1)).
227. The leading commentators on Delaware corporate law have stated that devices such as
appointing a director to serve as an "arbitrator" have already been approved under section 141(a) of
the Delaware Code. See 1 E. FOLK, R. WARD, & E. WELCH, supra note 166, § 141.1, at 96-97 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800 (Del. 1966)).
228. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
229. The arbitration provision could stipulate that some or all of those protections remain in
force. The Supreme Court has recently held that courts interpreting the FAA should give effect to
various state procedural rules when they are referred to by the parties as part of their arbitration
agreement. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S.
Ct. 1248 (1989). An interesting question would be posed if a public corporation adopted an arbitra-
tion provision in its charter, successfully asserted this provision to force a derivative action from
court into arbitration, and then attempted to have the derivative claim dismissed by arbitrators on
the basis of a report by a special litigation committee (SLC). Could the corporation enjoy the bene-
fits of deference to a SLC in addition to the advantages of having arbitrators rather than judges
decide the case? Since the parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes, deference by arbitrators to
the conclusions of another tribunal would appear to violate the mandate of the arbitration provision.
A report by a SLC could certainly be received by the arbitrators as evidence. The presence of an
arbitration agreement, however, strongly suggests that the parties intended neutral arbitrators, not
directors of the corporation, to hear and decide the merits of their dispute.
230. The chief danger of a collusive settlement lies in the possibility that the settlement will be
formalized in a judgment that will have res judicata effects on shareholders who have not taken part
in the litigation. The motive for the corporation to enter into such a settlement is to obtain, for a
minimal price, a strong defense against any further litigation on the subject matter of the claim. The
settlement of a lawsuit provides the context for such preclusion by enabling the parties to stipulate to
the entry of a final judgment in favor of the corporation or to a dismissal of the suit "with prejudice."
While a final arbitration award may have res judicata effects similar to the effects of a final court
judgment, see Shell, supra note 23, at 639-47, the settlement of an arbitration need not have preclu-
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Moreover, courts may fashion, as they have in the context of class actions, spe-
cial procedures to review arbitration settlements.
2 31
More importantly, arguments based exclusively on state law and policy
would carry little weight under the FAA and reflect an outdated suspicion of a
forum that the Supreme Court has deemed an "adequate substitute" for the
courts for the resolution of complex statutory claims.232 After the Supreme
Court's decisions in Southland and Perry, state public policy arguments simply
do not apply in the analysis of enforcement questions under the FAA. In pass-
ing the FAA, Congress "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration. '233 The Court has left no room for distinguishing state
shareholder protection polices from the franchisee and employee protection poli-
cies that were at issue in Southland and Perry.
234
The force of this counterargument is underscored by the fact that the New
York Court of Appeals has already held that the FAA preempts state law re-
specting corporate and derivative remedies against corporate officers and direc-
tors. In GAF Corp. v. Werner 235 the chairman of the board of GAF, Jesse
Werner, was sued by shareholders in five separate derivative actions in which
plaintiffs alleged waste, mismanagement, and self-dealing. Soon thereafter Wer-
ner lost a proxy fight for control of GAF and was terminated. His compensation
contract with GAF contained an arbitration clause and, when the new manage-
ment refused to honor that contract, Werner demanded arbitration. The corpo-
ration's new management group, meanwhile, elected to pursue the derivative
claims against Werner and moved to stay his employment contract arbitration
pending resolution of this litigation.
236
The court refused to grant the stay. The court held that the arbitration
clause was governed by the FAA, and that recent Supreme Court decisions had
"emphasized again and again the overriding force of the policy favoring arbitra-
tion .... -237 Moreover, the court rejected GAF's argument that arbitration
would deny shareholders and the corporation their right to a judicial forum
guaranteed by section 720 of the New York Business Corporation Law.238 The
sive effects. Under the AAA rules, arbitrators may enter a "consent award" based on a settlement
by the parties if requested to do so. See AAA RULE 44. If such a settlement were converted into a
consent award solely for the purpose of unfairly prejudicing nonparty plaintiffs, however, the award
could be challenged under the FAA by other shareholders as having been procured by "fraud or
undo means." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
231. See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
232. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2338-39 (1987).
233. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
234. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
235. 66 N.Y.2d 97, 485 N.E.2d 977, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1985).
236. Id. at 99-101, 485 N.E.2d at 979, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
237. Id. at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 980, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
238. Section 720, entitled "Action against directors and officers for misconduct," creates a prl-
vate right of action on behalf of shareholders, the corporation, and others to sue officers and direc-
tors for mismanagement and self-dealing. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1986).
GAF argued that this statute "was intended to protect shareholders of a publicly held corporation
against the waste, overreaching and misconduct of corporate officers and directors, against which
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court, citing Southland, held that the FAA preempted section 720 and ordered
the arbitration to go forward.
2 39
While state-originated policies may not stand in the way of enforcement of
public shareholder arbitration under the FAA, the Supreme Court has stated
that "[l]ike any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be over-
ridden by a contrary congressional command." 24° If another federal statute evi-
dences a congressional intent to restrict the force of the FAA, therefore,
arbitration can be avoided. Such legislative intent can be discerned from I) the
statutory text, 2) legislative history, or 3) "an inherent conflict between arbitra-
tion and the statute's underlying purposes." 24 1 The question thus arises as to
whether there are policies underlying any federal statute that might be enlisted
to defeat an arbitration provision in a corporate charter. It could be argued, for
example, that Congress has scrupulously drafted legislation that regulates public
corporations so as to avoid preempting state laws relating to corporate govern-
ance. Implicitly, this legislative strategy has furthered a public policy of federal
noninterference with corporate internal affairs. 242 Thus, if states would forbid
arbitration of shareholder suits,243 the FAA might be read to reflect this
preference.
244
such shareholders are ill equipped to protect themselves." Werner, 66 N.Y.2d at 103, 485 N.E.2d at
981, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
239. The court stated that public shareholders were no more helpless or disadvantaged than the
franchisees seeking a judicial forum in the Southland case:
Neither the public shareholder nor the franchisee has much bargaining power, but both the
franchisor and the directors and officers of a publicly held corporation are subject to gov-
ernmental oversight. We conclude, therefore, with respect to Business Corporation Law
§ 720, that the Supreme Court decisions, and particularly the Southland decision, foreclose
according it the effect for which GAF contends.
66 N.Y.2d at 103, 485 N.E.2d at 981, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See also Wydel Assocs. v. Thermasol,
452 F. Supp. 739, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that § 9(3)(e) of the Uniform Partnership Act,
which states that arbitration clauses entered into by less than all the partners are unenforceable, is
preempted by FAA because § 9(3)(e) limits arbitration with rules "not applicable to other
contracts").
240. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337 (1987).
241. Id.
242. See, eg., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) ("state law.., is the font of corporate
directors' powers. By contrast, federal law in this area is largely regulatory and prohibitory in na-
ture-it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only rarely creates it."); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977) (holding that § 10(b) of the 1934 Act could not be used in
cases involving simple claims of breach of fiduciary duty by shareholders against managers). It
should be noted, however, that the Court in Burks was careful to point out that "specific aberrant or
hostile state rules" in opposition to a firm federal policy "will not be applied." Burks, 441 U.S. at
479-80 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 596 (1973)). The
federal policy favoring liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses is arguably such a policy, and state
rules forbidding arbitration might be construed as hostile to that policy.
243. Research reveals no express statutory prohibitions in state corporation statutes forbidding
arbitration.
244. Cf. Swenson v. CDI Corp., 670 F. Supp. 1438, 1441 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.
1988) (but reaching a similar conclusion).
It is not inconceivable that Congress through the express language of a federal statute or
the supporting legislative history, could articulate an intent to preclude waiver ofjudicial
remedies not only for violations of federal statutory rights but also for violation of similar
state statutory rights, thereby exempting these particular state statutes from the provisions
of the Federal Arbitration Act.
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An implied repeal of the FAA based on an absence of congressional action
is legally unsound and would mean that the FAA should not apply to claims in a
variety of subject areas Congress has left to the states. Such an interpretation of
congressional intent would be unduly hostile to arbitration and would directly
contradict the broad edict of section 2.245 Indeed, courts are reluctant to find a
repeal of the FAA even in subject areas that Congress has expressly left to the
states. For example, Congress has left the field of insurance regulation largely to
the states,246 yet courts have ruled that the FAA governs arbitration agreements
involving insurance companies. 247 Where Congress has not explicitly spoken, as
is the case in the corporate governance area, it seems even less likely that courts
would reject application of the FAA.248
Although the implied repeal argument would not justify a blanket exemp-
tion from section 2, the door is still open to specific exemptions for federal
claims where there is evidence of a congressional intent to bar arbitration. 24 9
One federal statute, section 16 of the 1934 Act, 250 creates a federal right to bring
derivative actions and might be a candidate for such an exemption. Section 16
provides shareholders with a unique federal right of action to sue certain statuto-
rily defined "insiders" on behalf of the corporation to recover trading profits
from so-called "short-swing" trades, matching purchases and sales or sales and
purchases of a company's stock that take place within any six month time pe-
riod.25 1 Section 16(b) differs from the traditional derivative action in that it is
governed exclusively by federal law, which does not require shareholders to post
any type of security bond, force shareholders to prove that they were owners at
the time the alleged insider trading occurred, or permit corporations to dismiss
suits based on reports by special litigation committees.
252
Prior to McMahon, courts might have relied on the 1953 Supreme Court
decision in Wilko v. Swan 253 to hold that section 16(b) actions may not be arbi-
trated. In Wilko the Court interpreted the nonwaiver provision of the Securities
Id. at 1441.
245. Section 2 of the FAA applies to all contracts affecting interstate, foreign, or maritime com-
merce. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
246. The McCarren-Ferguson Act expressly declares that the business of insurance should con-
tinue to be subject to the laws of the several states. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982); see R. KEETON, INSUR-
ANc E LAW § 8.1(a), at 538 (1971) (explaining the purpose of the Act and the political forces behind
its enactment).
247. See Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971) (FAA applies unless it
"invalidates, impairs or supercedes a state law regulating the business of insurance"); Bernstein v.
Centaur Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 98, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F.
Supp. 554, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that McCarran-Ferguson Act bars application of FAA
because there is a state law regulating insurance).
248. Indeed, given the substantial federal control over proxy solicitations, other communications
with shareholders, and the issuance of securities as embodied in the federal securities laws and the
rules of the SEC, it is arguable that no clear federal policy dictates that corporate governance issues
be left exclusively to the states. See supra note 242.
249. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982); Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading: A Proposal for Re-
vising Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 511 (1988).
251. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 8.6.1, at 293-96; Samuelson, supra note 250, at 511-12.
252. R. CLARK, supra note 19, § 8.6.1, at 294.
253. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), section 14,254 as an expression of congressional
intent to exempt claims under that statute from the FAA.255 The 1934 Act has
a similar nonwaiver provision, 256 and both section 16(b) of the 1934 Act and the
liability section at issue in Wilko, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act,257 are express
rights of action.
In McMahon, however, the Court refused to extend Wilko to claims under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,258 and nothing in either the text or legislative
history of section 16(b) suggests that this provision of the 1934 Act should be
treated differently from section 10(b). 259 Section 16(b) is designed to compen-
sate the corporation for a certain defined set of insider trading violations. 2
60
Arbitrators would appear to be perfectly capable of determining when such vio-
lations have occurred and of calculating damages. There thus appears to be no
ground for arguing that section 16(b) derivative claims are nonarbitrable.
One might also argue that an inherent conflict between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1 and the arbitration of shareholder claims demonstrates
congressional intent to bar arbitration.261 Rule 23.1 is the federal analogue to
state statutes governing derivative claims and provides the procedures by which
such actions must proceed when they are brought in a federal court. Under rule
23.1 the complaint in a derivative suit must be verified, the plaintiff must prove
that he was a shareholder at the time of the transaction at issue and that he is an
adequate representative of other shareholders similarly situated, a proper de-
mand must be made or its absence explained, and both court approval and no-
tice to other shareholders is required before an action may be dismissed or
settled.262 The use of arbitration would frustrate the policies inherent in this
rule by eliminating the stipulated procedural safeguards and bypassing judicial
'approval of settlements.
This argument has several limitations. First, it would only apply in cases
brought in federal court, because state courts operate under their own civil rules
and, as noted previously, states lack the authority to refuse enforcement of an
254. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
255. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432-35.
256. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982).
257. Id. § 771(2).
258. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2341.
259. It could be argued that there is some distinction between § 16(b) and § 10(b) liability in that
§ 16(b) creates an express right of action while § 10(b) liability is implied. See Brown, Shell &
Tyson, supra note 2, at 17-18. This distinction does not appear to make a difference on the question
of arbitrability, however. The Supreme Court now has under consideration a case squarely address-
ing whether the express civil liability provision addressed in Wilko, § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, is arbi-
trable. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 389 (1988). Most
commentators agree that the Court will overrule Wilko and hold that this express liability provision
is arbitrable. Shell, supra note 2, at 415 n.118.
260. Samuelson, supra note 250, at 513-17.
261. The federal rules, while procedural, have the force of law. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1030 (2d ed. 1987) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
the effect of law. Statutes enacted prior to the rules [1938] that are inconsistent with them are
superceded.").
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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otherwise valid arbitration agreement. 263 Second, rule 23.1 is primarily a proce-
dural rule of court, 264 whereas the FAA is a body of "federal substantive
law."'265 It seems unlikely that a court would find that the requisites of a proce-
dural rule outweigh the policies of a conflicting substantive law. Third, there
may in fact be no inherent conflict between arbitration and the procedural hur-
dles that characterize rule 23.1. As noted earlier,266 statutory derivative suit
procedures are largely designed to protect the corporation from the threat of
frivolous claims by shareholders, not to give the shareholder any special reme-
dies. Corporations should thus be free to waive the protections embodied in rule
23.1 when they choose to substitute arbitration for litigation under a derivative
suit statute. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, both arbitration proce-
dures and judicial rules may be adjusted to take account of the policies underly-
ing rule 23.1. Arbitrators hearing a derivative claim should adopt those portions
of rule 23.1 that are appropriate under the circumstances to avoid any conflict.
For example, arbitrators should require the plaintiff shareholder to prove that
she owned shares at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and that the plaintiff is
an adequate representative of shareholder interests.
267
Finally, courts may make adjustments to traditional arbitration practice to
avoid any possible conflict with the requirements of rule 23.1. State courts have
recently approved the concept of conducting class actions as arbitrations.
268
Under the California procedure the court handles the preliminary issues of class
certification and notice before sending the case to an arbitration panel for trial.
263. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
264. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (holding that New
Jersey derivative suit securities-for-expenses statute was substantive in character and must be applied
by a federal court hearing a derivative claim under its diversity jurisdiction and commenting that
rule 23's procedural requirements, which "neither create nor exempt from liabilities," do not conflict
with such state substantive laws). The issue of whether rule 23.1 is substantive or procedural is not
finally settled. For example, if the applicable state law had no contemporaneous ownership require-
ment, would a federal court hearing a derivative claim under its diversity jurisdiction be permitted to
dismiss the claim of a noncontemporaneous owner under rule 23.1? If the contemporaneous owner-
ship aspect of rule 23.1 is procedural, the answer is "yes." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). If this requirement, or a lack thereof, is substantive in character, however, the federal court
would be obligated under Erie to apply the state rule. Commentators have argued that rule 23.1
should be considered procedural in such circumstances, but they admit the matter is not free of
doubt. See 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1829
(2d ed. 1986).
265. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
266. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
267. Indeed, where both federal and state law require that the plaintiff in a derivative action be a
contemporaneous shareholder, arbitrators who entertain a claim from a noncontemporaneous share-
holder would probably be acting in "manifest disregard" of applicable law. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
268. See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 608-15, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206-10, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 374-78 (1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
17 (1984) (Supreme Court refused to address issue of whether class actions were permitted under
FAA); Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 1, 3-4, 413 A.2d 667, 669 (1980) (approving class
action arbitration by state lottery winners against state); Gainey v. Occidental Land Research, 186
Cal. App. 3d 1051, 1053-56, 231 Cal. Rptr. 249, 250-52 (1986) (approving use of class action arbitra-
tion by limited partners against general partner for breach of fiduciary duty); Note, Keating v. Supe-
rior Court: Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1239, 1250-53
(1983); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV.
787 (1981).
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The case then returns to the court for confirmation if there is a settlement or
award. 269 There is no reason why similar procedures might not be adopted with
respect to derivative claims under the federal rules in order to further the liberal
policy of the FAA favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.
In sum, the legal arguments supporting the enforcement of a corporate arbi-
tration provision appear capable of meeting every objection that might be raised
under the FAA. These arguments, however, do not answer the policy objections
that will be heard from scholars and others concerned about the effects arbitra-
tion might have on the traditional model of corporate governance and on the
ability of the state to regulate the affairs of large corporations. The Article now
returns to these concerns.
B. Arbitration and the Public Corporation: The Policy Debate
Scholars representing diverse points of view appear ready to accept arbitra-
tion as a means of resolving public shareholder disputes. Economist Daniel Fis-
chel, while not advocating arbitration, has nevertheless expressed surprise that
arbitration is not encountered in the public corporation setting.270 Moreover,
since economists tend to view shareholder litigation skeptically, 271 any step in
the direction of reducing costs and distancing such suits from the courts is likely
to meet with their approval.
Professor John Coffee, the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Cor-
porate Governance Project section on "Remedies," has identified numerous
practical and legal objections to the arbitration of public shareholder disputes
based on current law and policy,272 but he has nevertheless advocated that pub-
lic corporations be permitted to adopt arbitration under certain conditions. He
has proposed that arbitration be permitted so long as the process is adequately
structured to protect shareholder and public interests. 273 Such protection
should be assured, according to Coffee, by requiring corporations to adopt
model arbitration provisions drafted and monitored by neutral groups such as
the ALI.274
Other scholars favoring intrusive legal intervention in corporate affairs have
not yet spoken on the issue of arbitration, but some are sure to criticize the
arbitration alternative. Such critics are likely to raise a number of objections.
Critics can be expected to echo the objections already discussed regarding sterili-
zation of the board, the inadequacy of arbitration procedures to handle complex
cases, and the possibility of collusive settlements if there is no oversight by a
269. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d at 608-15, 645 P.2d at 1206-10, 183 Cal, Rptr. at
374-78.
270. Ribstein, supra note 115, at 388-89 (Professor Fischel remarking that "I've been troubled
for a long time about why there isn't more use of [arbitration]."). Professor Fischel's observation is
based on the model of the corporation utilized by economists.
271. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
272. Coffee, supra note 12, at 953-70.
273. Coffee, supra note 12, at 970-72.




On a practical level, critics may also argue that arbitration will result in
prejudice to shareholders because courts are reluctant to grant injunctive relief
in cases where arbitration has been stipulated. 27 6 In cases where mergers and
takeovers are at issue, injunctions may be crucial in preserving the corporate
status quo pending a resolution on the merits of the controversy. There is also
danger that corporations will manipulate the manner in which arbitrators are
named and "stack the deck" against shareholders to assure favorable results in
arbitration.27 7 Finally, arbitrators may refuse to award legal fees to successful
plaintiffs' lawyers and remove the incentive for bringing derivative suits in the
first instance.
27 8
On a more fundamental level, critics may argue that arbitration threatens
substantive shareholder rights and weakens the deterrent effects of fiduciary
rules. Arbitration awards need not be based on or explained in terms of the
law. 279 Fiduciary norms may therefore be subordinated to general equitable
principles in arbitration, a result that would lead to inconsistent application of
existing legal rules and a reduction in the deterrent value of such rules.2 80 Ar-
guably, shareholders would cease to have any meaningful legal rights under cor-
porate law if the only decision makers to which they could apply for relief would
be free to misapply the law.
28 1
In addition, relegating a category of claims traditionally decided in public
by courts to the sphere of private adjudication would deprive the community of
shareholders and corporations of access to a developing body of legal norms
with which to meet changing economic conditions. Arbitrators rarely write
opinions.2 82 With no authoritative statements by courts regarding the duties of
management in changing economic circumstances, the law of fiduciary duty
275. Coffee, supra note 12, at 965-66; supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
276. See Karmel, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act: A Perspective
from Contract Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1373, 1375-86 (1987) (reviewing approaches of the courts in
issuing injunctive relief); Note, The United States Arbitration Act and Preliminary Injunctions: A
New Interpretation of an Old Statute, 66 B.U.L. Rav. 1041, 1044 (1986) (noting that both federal
and state courts are split on the issue of whether preliminary injunctions may be obtained pending
arbitration).
277. Coffee, supra note 12, at 956-57 (suggesting that corporations may seek to have arbitration
panels appointed from the ranks of disinterested directors or management-appointed experts).
278. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
280. Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L.
REV. 271, 292 (1970) (arguing that arbitration of close corporation disputes involving breaches of
fiduciary duty should be prohibited because "many legal rights and duties.., would cease to exist.
Fiduciary standards, for example, would be enforced by private ad hoc dispensations of equity which
might be devoid of precedential consistency. As a result there would be no legal norms to govern
and deter management misconduct .... ").
281. Arbitrators may make errors of law without fear of judicial review, but they may not ex-
hibit "manifest disregard" of legal rules. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Of course, parties may request that arbitra-
tors write opinions, and there is evidence in caselaw that parties do so. Eg., Raytheon Co. v. Com-
puter Distrib., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1986) (upholding award in which arbitrators
rendered full opinion, including a concurrence and a dissent). The American Arbitration Associa-
tion also provides for written opinions in international cases and, to a more limited extent, in securi-
ties cases. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
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would be frozen. The privacy and lack of legal accountability of arbitration
might substantially weaken state regulation of large business enterprises.
These arguments have force, but they are unpersuasive when examined in
the light of the forseeable realities of corporate arbitration. As noted above, the
charge that enforcement of arbitration provisions will lead to "governance by
arbitrators" is an empty threat. Arbitration of public shareholder disputes
would not replace governance by boards of directors. Arbitration would be an
alternative to the judicial forum for the resolution of discrete, relatively rare
controversies. It has been estimated that on average a corporation experiences a
shareholder action once every 6.7 years.2 83 The use of arbitrators to decide
these matters would not impinge on normal business decision making to any
greater extent than do judicial decisions under current practice. Indeed, the rel-
ative informality of arbitration suggests that normal business operations would
be less disrupted than is now the case during the pendency of the suit.
As for practical concerns regarding prejudice to shareholders, the difficulty
of obtaining injunctive relief pending arbitration is overstated. Although several
district courts have interpreted the FAA as forbidding the issuance of injunc-
tions pending arbitration,284 no appellate court has so held.285 Rather, the cir-
cuit courts have adopted a variety of legal tests that to varying degrees permit
the issuance of injunctions to maintain the status quo pending arbitrators' reso-
lution of the dispute.28 6 Given the trend of these decisions favoring injunctive
relief, there is no reason to bar arbitration on policy grounds because of a fear
that shareholders' rights will be prejudiced.
The charge that corporations could "stack the deck" by appointing arbitra-
tion panels sure to make findings favorable to management ignores the fact that
the FAA, as well as other arbitration statutes, provides relief from awards that
result from such obvious bias.287 Moreover, charges that such bias is built into
ARBITRATION RULES Rule 7 (effective Feb. 1, 1986); AAA SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES Rule
42 (effective Sept. 1, 1987).
283. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence ofShareholder Derivative and Class Ac-
tion Lawsuits. 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. Rxv. 306, 313 (1980).
284. See, eg., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thompson, 575 F. Supp. 978, 979
(N.D. Fla. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Thompson, 574 F. Supp. 1472,
1478 (E.D. Mo. 1983). The argument that the FAA does not permit injunctive relief is premised on
language in § 3 that requires the court, "on the application of one of the parties, [to] stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
285. Karmel, supra note 276, at 1375.
286. See, eg., Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985); Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos,
Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing to permit injunctions pending arbitration
unless the parties' contract explicitly permits injunctive relief). Another panel of the Eighth Circuit
subsequently decided an arbitration-injunction case using a different test than the one employed by
the Hovey court. See Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Food Corn, Inc., 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984) (em-
ploying traditional preliminary injunction test addressing likelihood of success on the merits);
Karmel, supra note 276, at 1380.
287. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982); UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, § 12(2), 7 U.L.A. 140 (1985). Professor
Coffee points out that the securities industry arbitration system permits the industry to name arbitra-
tion panels in disputes with customers and expresses his fear that "many corporations will seek to
provide for arbitration by either a panel of disinterested directors or by some other panel of manage-
ment-appointed experts." Coffee, supra note 12, at 956. There are limits under the FAA to the
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the system under which arbitrators are selected have a way of triggering vigor-
ous public debate. In the securities area, for example, the industry has recently
modified its rules governing the appointment of arbitrators in response to public
criticism that its system was biased.28 8 Indeed, both state28 9 and federal 290 se-
curities regulators are moving to ensure that the arbitrator selection system is
fair. Were shareholder suits arbitrated on a widespread basis, similar public
pressures and regulatory actions would likely develop to assure neutrality in the
arbitrator selection process.
The concern over arbitrators' award of attorneys' fees invites two answers.
First, the arbitration provision may contain an explicit promise of fees to suc-
cessful plaintiffs as an inducement to provide adequate monitoring.29 1 Second,
even in the absence of such contractual provisions, arbitrators routinely award
fees when the underlying cause of action so provides.292 Because the derivative
claim depends on fee awards for its very existence, arbitrators can be expected to
award fees in derivative cases. If arbitrators refused to follow this practice, their
award could be challenged under the FAA as being in "manifest disregard" of
the law.
293
The more basic policy arguments against arbitration are likewise unpersua-
sive. As for deterrence, 294 the effects under current practice of the vague legal
types of arbitrators who may be appointed to hear cases. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (discussing rights of parties under the FAA to impar-
tial tribunals). Even in securities industry arbitration, plaintiffs are given the opportunity to chal-
lenge arbitrators both with and without cause, and a majority of the arbitration panel must be drawn
from a pool of "public [Le. nonindustry] arbitrators." Moreover, the defendant securities exchange
member does not appoint the panel. Rather, the Director of Arbitration for the securities exchange
does so under rules approved by the SEC. Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 2, at 35-36 nn. 94-95;
see Lipton, Discovery Procedures and the Selection and Training of Arbitrators: A Study of Securities
Industry Practices, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 435, 452-55 (1988). The arbitration system feared by Professor
Coffee under which one party would appoint all the arbitrators appears to be unprecedented.
288. See Shell, supra note 2, at 422-27.
289. Harlan, Massachusetts Says Brokers Can't Insist on Arbitration, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1988,
at 41, col. 5 (stating that a survey of the North American Securities Administrators Association
reveals "a dozen or more states in the next six months expect to consider rules banning forced
arbitration"). A federal district court in Massachusetts recently struck down the Massachusetts
regulation on the grounds that it conflicted with the FAA. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly,
1988 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94, 107 (D. Mass. 1988).
290. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1053 (describing federal bill introduced by Representative
Boucher to improve securities arbitration practices and procedures); Shell, supra note 2, at 430-32.
291. Cf. Bernard v. Kuhn, 65 Md. App. 557, 501 A.2d 480 (1985) (shareholders agreed to arbi-
tration provision containing attorneys' fee stipulation).
292. See Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982) (approv-
ing award of attorneys' fees by arbitrators in Copyright Act claim); Hoellering, Remedies in Arbitra-
tion, 20 FORUM 516, 526-28 (1985); Shell, supra note 111, at 35-38. Under the Uniform Arbitration
Act, arbitrators do not have the power to award attorneys' fees. See UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 10
("Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, to-
gether with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration,
shall be paid as provided in the award."); Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of New England, Inc., 380
Mass. 91, 401 N.E.2d 839 (1980). Parties who wish to assure that arbitrators will feel free to make
awards should therefore take care to stipulate that the FAA is to govern this question.
293. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
294. Although deterrence is an important goal of shareholder suits, derivative suits are, as a
matter of law, primarily compensatory in nature. Courts have consistently rebuffed attempts to
characterize the derivative suit as having deterrence as its primary purpose. See Bangor Punta Oper-
ations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 717-18 n.14 (1974); Coffee & Schwartz,
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standards on the actual behavior of officers and directors are matters of consid-
erable doubt. Corporate managers typically do not respond to each new judicial
pronouncement regarding fiduciary duties. Rather, they rely on lawyers to in-
form them of their duties under the court decisions. In the area of fiduciary
duties, however, even the most experienced legal advisors frequently make incor-
rect predictions regarding the application of the business judgment rule.295 In
short, the uncertainty of fiduciary law makes it unlikely that a reduction in judi-
cial pronouncements will unduly hinder corporate decision making.
Moreover, arbitration may be capable of conveying at least some form of
deterrent message. Even though arbitration proceedings are conducted privately
and little or no explanation of awards is provided, the fact of an award and its
amount frequently become public knowledge and may send a deterrent signal to
the corporate community. Awards are sometimes reported in the press, 2 9 6 and
when parties seek to vacate or confirm an award, courts publish opinions in
which the names of the parties, the nature of the claims, and the amounts of the
awards are made public. Were arbitration to become a common practice in the
area of shareholder disputes, the pressure to systematize this sort of disclosure
would doubtless grow, as is now happening in the securities industry with re-
spect to public customer claims.
297
Achieving consistent application of the law in derivative cases does not nec-
essarily require litigation. The fiduciary standards applied by courts in corpo-
rate cases are essentially equitable principles that depend on contextual evidence
and call for an intimate familiarity with corporate custom and practice for effec-
tive legal implementation. Expert arbitrators are as likely as judges to possess
this familiarity, as demonstrated by the fact that arbitrators have been deciding
close corporation disputes involving breaches of fiduciary duty for years. 298
There is no doubt that arbitral resolution of shareholder disputes will re-
duce the occasions for courts to generate public fiduciary duty rules, but this is
no reason for prohibiting arbitration. Quite simply, it is unlikely that all or even
most public corporations will adopt arbitration. As discussed at more length in
part IV of this Article, both structural and practical difficulties ensure that arbi-
tration will not overtake litigation as the major forum for resolving public share-
holder disputes in the public corporation. There will then be a continuing
source of litigated cases involving public corporations from which to discern
supra note 116, at 302 ("although a deterrent rationale for the derivative action has occasionally
been recognized by the ourts ... it has never been the dominant rationale, and indeed some deci-
sions appear frankly skeptical of it"); Cox, supra note 9, at 761-62; Comment, supra note 11, at 889
("The law characterizes the derivative suit as a compensatory device.").
295. In a number of the most noted recent corporate takeover decisions, for example, even
highly experienced counsel have been incorrect in their judgment regarding the legality of certain
defensive tactics used by target companies. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
296. See, eg., Miller, High-Tech World Sees IBM Case as a Way Out of the Copyright Maze,
Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (reporting on IBM-Fujitsu arbitration award); supra note 3
and accompanying text.
297. Shell, supra note 2, at 427.
298. See supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
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evolving legal norms. Even if arbitration were to become the dominant forum,
the example of the close corporation suggests that the law is not likely to stag-
nate. The fiduciary duties of close corporation shareholders continue to exist
and develop despite the fact that arbitration is widely used by such parties.
299
Finally, this argument against arbitration proves too much. Negotiated settle-
ments also deprive the courts of opportunities to declare new rules, but few ar-
gue that settlements should be prohibited for this reason.
30°
In sum, the policy arguments against arbitration are based largely on
doubtful behavioral assumptions and unwarranted skepticism about the efficacy
of arbitration. Corporations bent on abusing arbitration would, of course, have
opportunities to do so, but these same corporations may presently abuse the
litigation system. It is not the fault of a dispute resolution system that parties
use abusive tactics; but it is up to the dispute resolution system to adjust its
procedures to minimize the likelihood that such tactics will succeed. Arbitra-
tion law is as capable as corporate law of making such adjustments to accommo-
date shareholder claims.
IV. PUBLIC SHAREHOLDER ARBITRATION: A REMEDY FOR THE FUTURE?
Assuming for the moment that the legal and policy arguments set forth
above in favor of arbitration prevail, will the arbitration remedy become the
wave of the future for shareholder disputes? If one assumes that the legal con-
straints formerly standing in the way of using arbitration have been the major
factor in discouraging its use, the answer would seem to be "yes." Both a theo-
retical perspective based on transaction cost economics and the practical limita-
tions on arbitral procedures, however, suggest that nonlegal factors are
responsible for the total absence of precedent for arbitrating public derivative
claims.
301
A. A Transaction Cost Model of Arbitration
Oliver Williamson has developed a comprehensive conceptual model of
contractual governance using an analytic tool called "transaction cost econom-
299. Indeed, scholars analyzing the structural and economic differences between close and public
corporations have concluded that the restricted nature of the markets in which a close corporation
operates suggests a need for stricter fiduciary duties on managers and majority shareholders in the
close corporation setting than in the context of a public corporation, which operates within active
markets for corporate control, managerial labor, and the corporation's securities. Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 69, at 291-97; Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fi-
duciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 9, 21-30 (1987). It is therefore arguable that
close corporations are in even greater need of authoritative pronouncements by courts regarding
fiduciary duties than public enterprises. Yet, as we have seen, arbitration is widely approved in the
close corporation setting. If close corporations with a more urgent need for fiduciary norms can do
without the courts, so can public corporations.
300. One prominent commentator has made this argument, however. See Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
301. It should be recalled that close corporation shareholders insisted on including arbitration
clauses in their agreements even when the legal environment was hostile. See supra notes 75-107 and
accompanying text. Research for this Article revealed no attempt by a public corporation to insert
an arbitration clause in its charter.
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ics. '" 30 2 Transaction cost economics is the study of the legal and nonlegal mech-
anisms 30 3 used by parties to reduce the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and
performing mutually beneficial agreements. This theory suggests that there may
be deep-seated, structural reasons why public corporations have not attempted
to use arbitration as a substitute for litigation in the past and, therefore, will not
use arbitration on a widespread basis in the future.304
Transaction cost economists focus on the human agents who make and per-
form commercial agreements to explore the world of private contracting. Trans-
action cost theory makes two basic assumptions about these human agents.
First, human beings have "bounded rationality"-they are not capable of know-
ing, understanding, or providing for all possible contingencies in their relation-
ships with others.305 In practice, the attribute of bounded rationality means that
people make contracts with less than perfect information about their contracting
partners and the future. Second, people are, to varying degrees, opportunistic
30 6
and will, if the chance arises, serve their self-interests in preference to and at the
expense of their contracting partners. Transaction cost theory does not assume
that all people are opportunistic all of the time. It is enough that some people
are inclined to "cheat" some of the time and that it is extremely difficult for the
noncheating parties to know who the opportunists are in advance. 30 7
To these two assumptions, transaction cost economics adds a principle that
"the most critical dimension for describing transactions is the condition of asset
specificity."' 308 This means that, given the twin assumptions of bounded ration-
ality and opportunism, the structure of contractual relations will vary most no-
302. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1986).
303. Oliver Williamson's work on transaction cost economics has emphasized nonlegal contrac-
tual governance mechanisms. Id. at 29 (property rights and mechanism design literature "work
within the tradition of legal centralism," while "transaction cost economics disputes that court or-
dering is efficacious"). Contract law scholars have also used a transaction cost approach to explain
why contract law doctrines serve, on occasion, to reduce the transaction costs of contracting within a
legal system. See, eg., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (1979);
Scott & Goetz, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261
(1980).
304. Williamson has explained that transaction costs "are the economic equivalent of friction in
physical systems." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 19. In a contractual relationship, examples
of such friction include communicating about and negotiating an agreement, monitoring perform-
ance to assure that performance is as promised, dealing with unexpected contingencies, and enforc-
ing the contract or obtaining compensation if the agreement breaks down before performance is
complete. Some friction is inherent in the contracting process, but all parties to an agreement benefit
to the extent that such costs can be reduced. Arbitration has long been recognized as an efficiency-
enhancing contractual governance mechanism. See, eg., Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions
Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REv. 665, 675 (1925). It is only recently, however, that commenta-
tors have explicitly tied the use of arbitration to transaction cost theory. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra
note 302, at 75; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 17, at 269.
305. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 44-47. Many economic models assume for purposes of
analysis that parties have perfect information regarding themselves, each other, and the world in
which they operate. Eg., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Transac-
tion cost economics explicitly assumes that this is not the case.
306. Oliver Williamson has defined opportunism as "self interest seeking with guile," 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 26 (1975), and has recently written that "opportunism re-
fers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 47.
307. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 64-67.
308. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 30.
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ticeably when the transaction in question is accompanied by investments in
assets-such as human skills, durable goods, or fixtures-that are specifically
tailored to the use at hand.30 9 Thus, a contract to build a nuclear power plant
requiring specially trained labor and investments in structures that have no al-
ternative uses should evidence a more complex contractual governance structure
than a contract for a builder to erect a prefabricated home using journeyman
carpenters and ordinary materials. Should the owner threaten to default in the
construction of the prefabricated home, the builder can sell both the structure
and his labor to another customer. Similarly, should the builder default, the
owner can doubtless find another carpenter and order another prefabricated
house. The parties building the nuclear plant, by contrast, face a significant risk
of loss should either party act opportunistically and demand contractual conces-
sions on price or performance once the project is well under way.310 Both par-
ties' investments in the nuclear plant have sharply lower values in most
alternative uses.
Contractual governance structures also vary according to the frequency
with which transactions recur between the same parties over an extended period
of time. The more frequently and the longer parties repeat transactions with one
another, the more likely they are to seek special contractual mechanisms to
economize on the transaction costs of their repeated dealings. 311 When highly
specific assets are at risk over a long period of time, the parties may move from a
conventional contracting relationship toward integration into a single business
entity, which will assure a maximum degree of monitoring and control over the
transactions at issue.312
Summarizing the transaction cost landscape of contract with terminology
borrowed from Professor Ian Macneil,3 13 Williamson describes contracts as fall-
ing into one of three general categories: classical, neoclassical, and relational. 314
Classical contracts involve discrete transactions in generic goods or services and
rely on markets for governance.3 15 Neoclassical contracts involve cross-market
309. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 53 ("Transactions that are supported by investments in
durable, transaction-specific assets experience 'lock-in' effects, on which account autonomous trad-
ing commonly will be supplanted by unified ownership (vertical integration).").
310. Opportunism in the adjustment of long-term contracts has been the subject of a lively de-
bate in the legal literature. See, eg., Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-
Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Eco-
nomic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854
(1978); Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981);
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 2005 (1988).
311. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 60.
312. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 78; M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 300-23
(1980) (discussing strategic advantages and risks of vertical integration under certain conditions).
313. Macneil, supra note 310. Professor Macneil is credited by many with founding and devel-
oping the "relational" theory of contracting. See Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of
Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565; Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution
to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 545. He has been a pioneer in focusing the attention of
the legal community on the human factors in contracting that profoundly affect the shape of legal
rules and that sometimes make legal rules superfluous.
314. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.
L. & ECON. 233, 235-38 (1979).
315. Id. at 236-37. The classical market does not operate in a legal vacuum. Rather, the market
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exchanges of more highly specified assets in which the parties are at risk for
longer periods of time.3 16 Examples of such contracts include complex con-
struction projects and long-term requirements or supply contracts. Relational
contracts involve integrated, continuous interactions between particular parties
such as the exchanges that occur between organized labor and corporate man-
agement. 3 17 A relational contract is, in reality, "a minisociety with a vast array
of norms beyond the norms centered on exchange and its immediate
processes.",
3 18
According to Williamson, arbitration frequently is used as a contractual
support mechanism in neoclassical and relational contracts where continuity (or
at least completion of the contract) is valued more highly than the right to seek
immediate enforcement of rights in a court.319 In both neoclassical and rela-
tional contracts, public ordering through litigation is not an attractive option.
First, in American culture, litigation is often a last resort and generally signals
that a relationship is at an end.320 Second, if the mere filing of a suit does not
end the relationship, discovery, pretrial tactics, delays, and a formal public trial
will drain away what little goodwill may remain between the litigants. Parties
contemplating long-term relationships thus seek reassurance in their contracts
that this form of legalized warfare will not be used against them.
Real-world practice seems to bear out Williamson's hypothesis. Neoclassi-
cal contracts such as long-term supply agreements, joint ventures, manufac-
turer-dealer relationships, and construction projects all frequently employ
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes.321 As noted at the outset of this
Article, roughly ninety-five percent of the "relational" collective bargaining
agreements between corporations and organized labor utilize grievance arbitra-
tion as a substitute for administrative and court ordering and strikes. 32 2
Arbitration helps to reduce the transaction costs of "continuing exchange
relation[s]" 323 in four primary ways. First, as noted above, the use of an arbitra-
tion clause helps to build an atmosphere of trust and goodwill and encourages
utilizes the standard rules of contract and tort law to enforce simple promises and deter fraud. The
parties invest little in customized rules and arrangements, however, because they can rely on the
market to supply substitutes should their contracting partners default.
316. Id. at 237-38.
317. Id. at 238.
318. Macneil, supra note 310, at 901.
319. Williamson, supra note 314, at 238 ("One important purposive difference in arbitration and
litigation that contributes to the procedural differences . . . is that, whereas continuity (at least
completion of the contract) is presumed under the arbitration machinery, this presumption is much
weaker when litigation is employed"). Arbitration may also be used as an alternative to the courts in
classical contracting situations simply to save time, money, and resources. The use of arbitration to
resolve consumer disputes is one example. See, e.g., Abrams, New York Lemon Law Arbitration
Program: Annual Report-1987, 43 ARB. J. 36 (Sept. 1988). Another example is arbitration of dis-
putes between customers and brokers in the securities industry. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
320. L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcr LAW IN AMERICA 206 (1965); Williamson, supra note 314, at
238 n.21.
321. See supra note 5.
322. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
323. Williamson, supra note 314, at 242.
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negotiated settlements of disputes. 324 Second, arbitrators can expand the trans-
action resources available to the parties at negotiation and renegotiation stages
by providing new information, ideas, and solutions to contractual impasses.
325
Third, arbitrators provide neutral "division services" to parties that reduce ten-
sion when the parties must divide the profits or losses resulting from their ef-
forts. 32 6 Finally and most obviously, arbitrators provide speedy, credible
enforcement services to deter opportunistic breaches of contract and to compen-
sate the wronged party when such breaches occur. 327 The expertise of arbitra-
tors, the informality and relative efficiency of arbitration procedures, and the
ability of arbitrators to rest their decisions on relational norms peculiar to the
parties-such as trade customs and courses of dealing-are attractive to parties
seeking governance structures that will give them confidence in their relation-
ships with one another.
In transaction cost terms, the corporation is a complex form of "relational"
contract.3 28 The corporate form of business enterprise offers equity investors
and managers a secure governance structure designed to encourage shareholders
to risk capital on relatively long-term projects selected and executed by corpo-
rate managers. Public and close corporations differ, however, along a critical
axis posited by transaction cost theory: asset specificity.
329
Close corporation shareholders' intimate involvement in management,
33 0
their inability to transfer ownership interests readily in a liquid market,331 and
their frequent risk of unlimited liability3 32 significantly increases both the asset
specificity and the potential duration of the shareholders' investments in the
close corporation. By contrast, the public corporation shareholder has no
human assets invested in the enterprise, the shareholder's financial contribution
is liquid and may readily be shifted to other investments, and the shareholder's
324. Cf. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 64, § 9.11, at 37 ("The existence of arbitration
procedures and the participants' knowledge that this quick method of settling controversies is readily
available induces successful negotiation of disputes that might otherwise reach an impasse.").
325. See, eg., Matter of Darman, 105 A.D.2d 1028, 483 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1984) (when owners of
close corporation reached impasse in negotiation regarding extent of equity of each shareholder,
arbitrators provided both an answer to the equity question and a control mechanism for parties to
resolve buy-out questions); Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 303, 315 (1978) (discussing use of
arbitration to adjust long-term contracts and to facilitate management-union relations over term of
collective bargaining agreement). Parties also turn to mediators when they seek additional ideas and
resources to break bargaining impasses. In mediation, as distinguished from arbitration, the parties
themselves retain control over the outcome of the negotiations. Silbey & Merry, Mediator Settle-
ment Strategies, 8 L. & POLIcY REv. 7, 7 (1986).
326. Heckathorn & Maser, Bargaining and the Sources of Transaction Costs: The Case of Gov-
ernment Regulation, 3 J. L. EON. & ORG. 69, 84 (1987).
327. Id.
328. Macneil, supra note 310, at 885 (discussing corporate law as a variety of relational contract
law); Williamson, supra note 314, at 238.
329. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
330. The fact that shareholders perform management services for the close corporation is likely
to mean that they have high "firm-specific human assets," including nontransferable skills and psy-
chological commitments, invested in the firm. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 302, at 313.
331. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 69, at 274-75.
332. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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personal wealth is not at stake beyond his or her equity contribution.3 33 Trans-
action cost analysis suggests that these sharp differences between close and pub-
lic shareholders in the degree of asset specificity in their investments and the
potential duration of their relationship with the corporation will lead to different
corporate governance structures. The close corporation structure will be more
complex and will rely, to a greater degree than public entities, on devices such as
arbitration to protect the relatively high level of asset specificity in the close
corporation shareholder's investment. The public shareholder, by contrast, is
more likely to rely on the market and to be satisfied with the standard menu of
protections provided by corporate law. As we have seen, arbitration is fre-
quently found in the close corporation setting but is not, as yet, a feature of
public corporation governance.
The fact that public corporations have not turned to formal arbitration as a
governance device does not mean that they lack the need for arbitral processes
to protect shareholder interests. On the contrary, a close examination of public
corporation practices reveals that with respect to shareholder suits a majority of
public corporations already utilize a nontraditional form of arbitration that may
take account of transaction cost concerns. The practice of using special litiga-
tion committees composed solely of independent nonparty directors to decide on
the merits of shareholder actions represents an explicit attempt to bring a form
of arbitral factfinding to the task of corporate governance. 334 Indeed, the courts
have treated special litigation committees in large measure as arbitration panels.
In two of the most important corporate law states, Delaware and New York,
judicial review of committee recommendations is based, like review of an arbi-
tration award, not so much on the merits of the decision as on a review of the
committee's independence, good faith, and method of investigation.33 5
333. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. More generally, the institution of the board
of directors is, in transaction cost terms, a complex "governance structure" for protecting the inter-
ests of shareholders, Williamson, supra note 89, at 1220, and most public corporations have a major-
ity of nonmanagement, outside directors serving on their boards. Id. at 1219-20. This use of neutral
outsiders to mediate the relationship between management and shareholders through the issuance of
binding management policy decisions, while not a traditional form of arbitration, certainly reflects
the spirit of using neutrals as a means of cementing relational contracts.
335. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 623, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979). But see Alford v. Shaw, 320
N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987) (rejecting Zapata and Auerbach approaches and holding that courts
should review merits of report by special litigation committee). The Delaware approach gives the
court the option of injecting its own "business judgment" in reviewing the special litigation commit-
tee's determinations, Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789, but the Delaware courts rarely utilize this form of
review in practice. Instead, using a deferential review, the courts have shown that they are capable
of detecting bias and conflicts of interest. See, eg., Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985)
(rejecting report of a one-person special litigation committee because of potential bias due to conflict
of interest). The criticism that such committees suffer from "structural bias," see Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 116, at 283, does not go to the institution of the special litigation committee itself, but
rather to the fact that the members of this committee, unlike true arbitrators, may not be neutral.
Significantly, commentators and at least one state have answered the "structural bias" problem with
proposals to give courts the authority to appoint the "neutrals" who are to serve. See Miller v.
Register and Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); Gevurtz, Who Represents the Corpo-
ration? In Search of a Better Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in Derivative Litigation,
46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 265, 321-35 (1985) (recommending appointment of third-party neutrals as
"provisional litigation directors" to serve on special litigation committees); American Law Institute,
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There are, to be sure, public corporations where the asset specificity of cer-
tain shareholders' investment is high. In many public corporations, large insti-
tutional or other groups hold sufficient shares to influence decisions, while the
public holds merely a passive, minority interest. 336 As a functional matter, the
holder of a very large block of stock in a public corporation is not free to sell it
at will any more than the holder of restricted stock in a close corporation.
337
The transaction cost model might predict, therefore, that corporations with such
concentrated ownership would seek arbitration for some of the same reasons as
close corporation shareholders.
It remains to be seen whether future developments will support this predic-
tion. Institutional investors are not like close corporation shareholders in a
number of important respects that might limit the application of the model. In
general, institutional investors seek no role in the management of the corpora-
tions whose stock they own, and institutions have little psychological capital
invested in their shares of stock. However, such investors may well decide that
arbitration is desirable as a way to reduce the costs and disruptions of unwar-
ranted shareholder suits, to reduce insurance premiums, and to signal confidence
in management. The relatively high degree of professional monitoring of corpo-
rate affairs engaged in by institutional investors puts them in an exceptionally
good position to make efficient decisions regarding arbitration.
In addition, a number of public corporations have dual classes of stock that
give full control over the company to relatively few holders of the control class
of shares, while the public owns nonvoting stock.3 38 These control shares repre-
sent highly specific assets to their owners and are often subject to the same trans-
fer restrictions one finds in a close corporation. By analogy to close
corporations, one might expect to observe arbitration as a means of contractual
governance among such controlling shareholders.
Even in dual class public corporations, however, the relationship between
controlling and public shareholders continues to be governed by the same basic
Corporate Governance Project § 7.03 (Tent. Draft No. 1 Apr. 1, 1982) (this proposal was later
dropped by the ALI in favor of a provision more receptive of the board's authority to appoint special
litigation committees); see also Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99 (D. Md. 1985)
(holding that Maryland would likely apply Zapata test, placing burden of proving independence,
good faith, and reasonable basis for its conclusions on corporation). A final step in the direction of
traditional arbitration might be to let the parties select the special litigation committee using the
rules of the American Arbitration Association.
336. See, eg., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 20-24 (1976) (noting the
importance of institutional investors in public corporations); Koppes & Gillan, ShareholderActivism,
2 INSIGHTS 11 (Dec. 1988) (discussing institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance
process); Sullivan, Two of Texaco's Institutional Holders To Seek a Role in Nominating Directors,
Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1988, at 5, col. 1; Wallace, Institutions Proxy Power Grows, N.Y. Times, July 5,
1988, at Dl, col. 3 (pension funds now own almost one-half of the stock of companies that make up
the Standard & Poor's 500 Index and 23.2% of all corporate equities).
337. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 213 (5th ed.
1980) ("holdings [in public corporations] may be so large that [shareholders] are locked in").
338. See, eg., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 68. Indeed, many public firms have consid-
ered recapitalizing themselves as dual class firms as a means of protecting against hostile takeovers-
a trend that recently prompted the SEC to issue a controversial new rule limiting the listing of such
dual class firms on national security exchanges. See Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common
Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1988).
19891
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
transaction cost incentives as prevail in the classic public corporation. The non-
voting shareholders still have access to a liquid market and have a relatively low
level of asset specificity in their investment. Moreover, by having freely chosen
their position in the company, they have signaled their willingness to take finan-
cial risk without the protection of even the traditional corporate governance
structure. Arbitration would therefore not be sought by noncontrolling share-
holders but may be imposed on them by the control group in these forms of
public enterprise.
B. Practical Constraints on the Use of Public Corporation Arbitration
Practical as well as transaction cost factors suggest that arbitration in the
public shareholder context will remain the exception rather than the rule. One
might expect that the simplicity, speed, and decisional expertise offered by arbi-
tration would be sufficient to make arbitration preferable to litigation even with-
out any special "relational" concerns to encourage its use. In practice, however,
arbitration of public shareholder disputes is quite likely to be anything but sim-
ple in many cases.
First, an arbitration charter provision may result in expensive, complex,
and frustrating litigation in both arbitral and judicial forums. It seems likely
that in some cases plaintiffs' lawyers will strongly resist the enforcement of arbi-
tration provisions out of suspicion that arbitrators will not be as favorably in-
clined to award large judgments and that attorneys' fees would be placed in
jeopardy. Protracted litigation over enforcement is therefore assured until some
of the complicated legal questions analyzed above339 are definitively sorted out
by the courts. Moreover, as noted earlier, there may be problems getting all of
the potential defendants into one arbitration forum.34° If so, cases will have to
proceed simultaneously in both the arbitral and judicial forums.
With respect to speed of resolution, studies have shown that arbitration is
not clearly superior to court litigation for the resolution of complex claims.
Complex arbitrations, like complex court cases, take a long time to resolve and
can be just as expensive as court trials.341 Moreover, a defendant takes the risk
that an arbitrator will render an extraordinary award of punitive or multiple
damages that will then be insulated from judicial review.342 Indeed, those attor-
neys who are most experienced with arbitration have expressed the greatest dis-
satisfaction with arbitration in the complex setting. These attorneys have
reported that arbitration and litigation are, at best, about equally attractive (or
339. See supra notes 167-269 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
341. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 24, at 14-18; Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitra-
tion, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 452, 461-62 (1988). The American Arbitration Association is aware of the
problems of arbitrating complex cases and is working to devise means of tailoring the arbitration
process to suit the needs of litigants facing a complex arbitration. See Coulson, Bringing Flexibility
and Innovation to Complex Cases, 43 ARB. J. 2 (Sept. 1988); Houck, Complex Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Designing a Process to Suit the Case, 43 ARB. J. 3 (Sept. 1988).
342. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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unattractive) for the adjudication of a complex case.
34 3
Finally, on the issue of expertise, Delaware-the state in which many
American public corporations are incorporated 344--is known for having as
judges some of the nation's leading experts in corporate matters. Arbitrators
may be found who are qualified to decide public shareholder cases, but such
individuals are not likely to know significantly more about corporate practice
than the judges of the chancery and supreme courts of Delaware. Indeed, the
Delaware courts and their expertise are a large measure of the reason that public
corporations choose to incorporate in that state.
Given these incentives and realities, there seem to be no obvious forces driv-
ing either plaintiffs' lawyers or public corporations toward arbitration and few
reasons to expect large numbers of public shareholder claims to be diverted from
the courts. Nevertheless, with arbitration now a legal possibility, it seems likely
that some experimentation will occur. This may take the form of the adoption
of arbitration provisions in corporations with highly concentrated ownership
structures or in firms with more diffuse ownership where management is seeking
ways to limit the litigation expenses associated with shareholder claims. In addi-
tion, shareholders seeking to reduce the influence of special litigation commit-
tees over the disposition of derivative claims may come to the realization that
arbitration offers an opportunity to reach the merits of the derivative dispute
before a neutral tribunal. Such shareholders may urge corporations to adopt
arbitration. If legislatures begin to view special litigation committees more skep-
tically and bar their use, corporate managers may seek arbitration as preferable
to judicial control over shareholder claims. Finally, arbitration may take place
in some instances pursuant to submission agreements between the parties when
both sides seek a quick, efficient adjudication of a shareholder complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that recent developments in the law gov-
erning the interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act have opened the door to
arbitrating disputes between public shareholders and the directors and officers of
public corporations. Shareholder suits occupy a prominent place in the conven-
tional model of corporate governance and are the primary source of substantive
law in areas such as the managers' duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.
Corporate law commentators can be expected to argue, therefore, that arbitra-
tion of such claims jeopardizes shareholders' rights by denying shareholders ac-
cess to the courts and by stunting judicial development of legal doctrines in this
area. Arbitration also threatens to insulate corporations from regulation by the
state through privatization of a major governance tool.
Interestingly, commentators have expressed fears very similar to these at
virtually every stage of the development of modem commercial arbitration.
343. Stipanowich, supra note 341, at 472 & n.249.
344. See Hays, Delaware's New Anti-Takeover Law is Contested by Campeau, Black & Decker,
Wall. St. J., Feb. 3, 1988, at 26, col. 3 (reporting that 56% of the "Fortune 500" and 45% of all
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware).
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Critics have worried that liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements would
eventually lead to the setting up of abusive, insulated systems of "private law"
operating outside the state's reach. 345 Such fears have seldom proved
warranted.
346
Close analysis of the challenges presented by arbitration in the corporate
governance area reveals that fears of threats to shareholder rights are similarly
overstated. Arbitration has been highly successful as a means of preventing and
resolving disputes in the close corporation arena, and there is no reason to think
that arbitrators could not do as good a job with public shareholder disputes.
Nor does it appear that the legal development of close corporation shareholders'
fiduciary duties has ceased because arbitration is available.
Arbitration is not without risk, and it is unlikely to be a panacea for the
complexities and expense of public shareholder litigation. Should serious
problems or abuses develop, shareholders have several means of correcting the
system. First, shareholders may seek stricter judicial review of arbitration
awards using existing doctrines. The FAA provides for review of awards ren-
dered by biased tribunals and awards that are in "manifest disregard" of the law.
Shareholders may also seek revocation of arbitration charter provisions through
the proxy machinery. Finally, Congress has the power to exempt shareholder
claims fully from the FAA.
Both organizational factors revealed by transaction cost analysis and practi-
cal concerns having to do with the complexity of shareholder cases and the spe-
cialized nature of corporate law indicate that arbitration of public shareholder
claims will be, at best, a complement to traditional court remedies. The indica-
tions that arbitration will play only a limited role in corporate governance, how-
ever, further strengthens the arguments for its use. With both courts and
arbitrators actively involved in deciding shareholder cases, there will be a con-
tinuing stream of judicial pronouncements to which arbitrators may refer in
making arbitration awards.
The evidence regarding arbitration in close corporations reveals that the
345. See, eg., Kronstein, Business Arbitration: Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J.
36,41, 60 (1944) (expressing fear that widespread use of commercial arbitration would lead to unfet-
tered self-regulation by business and the decline of the rule of law as a constraint on commercial
practice and stating that "historical precedent has shown that legislation designed to control corpo-
rate activities may be nullified through the use of arbitration and the substance of corporate law
changed to the detriment of the public control of corporations"). The Supreme Court struck down a
system of industry trade association arbitration in the motion picture business in 1930 on federal
antitrust grounds. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930). Para-
mount has not been followed in subsequent challenges to industry arbitration systems. See, e.g.,
Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1978) (securities arbitration system upheld).
346. Arbitrators lack the rigor of "legal discipline" in their decision making. See Shell, supra
note 2, at 421. More often than not, however, they do their best to apply the law fairly and render
awards based on the merits of the dispute. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L.
REv. 846, 861 (1961) (survey results indicating that 80% of arbitrators questioned believed they
ought to follow the law in making their awards even though they felt free to make an award based
primarily on the equities of the case); American Arbitration Association, Case Administration-
Update, Press Release (July 25, 1986) (study showing that only 13% of awards were within 10% of
half the amount claimed, thus demonstrating that arbitrators do not blindly "split the difference");
Stipanowich, supra note 341, at 485 (52% of attorneys questioned in ABA study believe that arbitra-
tors do not issue unjustifiable compromise awards).
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law has, in the past, been slow to accept innovative alternative means of resolv-
ing corporate governance disputes. In the end, however, the needs of sharehold-
ers have prevailed over the law's reluctance to change. Now that the door has
been opened to arbitration of public shareholder disputes, courts should take a
page from the book of close corporation law and permit corporations to experi-
ment with this and other alternatives to court ordering.

